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THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES
DEALERS:
CONTINUING GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRY COOPERATIVE
REGULATION IN THE OVER-THE-COUNTER
SECURITIES INDUSTRY*
THOMAS B. RUTTER'-

ALTHOUGH

THE INDUSTRY organizations formed under the
National Industrial Recovery Act were brought to their demise
by a Supreme Court decision' and public disinterest over their success,2 their lineal descendants continue to have a strong influence on
business practices in their respective industries. Chief among these
descendants is "the regulating instrument of the securities business," 3
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,4 which regulates
the activities of the overwhelming majority of firms5 acting as brokers6
or dealers' in the over-the-counter securities market' and their sales* An earlier draft of this article was submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of a Seminar in Securities Regulation at the University of Chicago
Law School. The author wishes to express his gratitude for the gadfly guidance of
Prof. Stanley H. Kaplan of that law school and for the critical reading given the
earlier version of Stephen E. Tallent, J.D., University of Chicago, '62.
t A.B., University of Chicago, 1959; J.D., 1962.
1. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
2. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV.
L. REv. 645, 663 (1946) ; SCHL4SINGISR, THS COMING 01 THn NEw DEAL 400 (1958);
but see SCHLESINGZR, TH8 PoLITICS o1 UPHXAVAL 283-7 (1960).

3. Report of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. to the Special
House Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce 1 (Subcommittee Print, 85th Cong. 2d 'Sess.) [hereinafter cited
as NASD Report].
4. A non-profit corporation incorporated under the laws of Delaware hereinafter
referred to as the NASD.
5. As of 1960 the figure was 4,466 branch offices. Wall Street Journal, March
23, 1961, p. 13, col. 1.
6. The term "broker" means any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank.
§ 3 (a) (4) Exchange Act.
7. The term "dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying and
selling securities for his own account, through a broker or otherwise, but does
not include a bank, or any other person insofar as he buys or sells securities for his
own account, either individually or in some fiduciary capacity not as a part of a
regular business. § 3(a) (5) Exchange Act.
8. "Over-the-counter securities market" means merely that the shares are not
traded on any securities exchange. To provide a jurisdictional basis for action by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (§ 15(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934) or the NASD (§ 15A(b) (3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), how-
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men.' This Association, established pursuant to Section 15A of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (hereinafter, Exchange Act)," ° is,
by virtue of the Congressional delegation of regulative power to a
trade association, "[a] n especially provocative exercise of governmental
power by a private organization. .

. .""

to explore the exercise of that power.
THE

It is the purpose of this paper

2

ASSOCIATION: BACKGROUND AND DESCRIPTION.

Within a short time of the passage of the National Industrial
Recovery Act an Investment Bankers Conference Committee was
estalished, including those engaged solely in the trading of securities
as well as investment bankers, and an Investment Bankers Code promulgated. The purpose of this Committee and Code was to bring about
self-regulation in the securities industry whereby those practices harmful to the investing public, and in part causative of the stock market
crash, might be eliminated. And, after the decision of the United
ever, the transaction must take place via "use of the mails or of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce."
The following description appears in Bloomenthal, The Case of the Subtle

Motive and the Delicate Art - Control and Domination in Over-the-Counter Securities Markets, 1960 DUKE L.J. 196, 199:
The over-the-counter

market

has

no

shape or form.

It

is a

desultory,

organized, ill-defined market completely dependent on the whims, views and decisions of thousands of dealers with no common denominator other than the profit
motive. There is no central reporting agency and no way to determine the extent
of a day's transactions in a particular security except in retrospect, and then
inadequately.
9. The term used in the industry for persons so employed is "registered representative"; the term formerly used, "customer's man," has apparently lost favor
due to the fact that they must now be registered with the NASD. "Registered representative" will be used hereafter in this paper. The Association's annual report for
1960 reveals that there are 93,828 registered representatives. Wall Street Journal,
loc. cit. supra,note 5.
10. 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1958). Citations to the Exchange Act will be to the statute as printed separately rather than as found in the
U.S.C. (e.g., § 1 and not § 78a).
11. 1 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 141 (2d ed., 1958).
The role of the NASD is an unusual one in the American legal system - a group
of private business competitors endowed by the legislature with power to regulate
the trade practices of the industry. The only analogous organization which comes
readily to mind is also a part of the securities industry - the stock exchanges. (See
infra, p. 617). Elsewhere there is either no regulation of trade practices, except
insofar as certain ones are actionable in the courts by the injured competitor
individually, or the regulatory power is in the hands of a governmental body under
the direct control of the executive or legislative branch of government. There is, of
course, industry participation in varying degrees in the regulation by governmental
bodies just as there is industry lobbying in Congress, but the difference between such
participation and the adjudicatory power exercised by the NASD is plainly one of
kind and not merely one of degree.
12. The range of exploration here is limited to reported decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission in reviewing NASD orders and court review of the
Commission orders. The reasons for this limitation are both pragmatic and
theoretic; pragmatic in that opinions of the NASD bodies are not open to the
public (see infra, note 60) ; theoretic in that just as a good test of a trial court's
functioning is in its record of reversal on appeal, so too a good test of the NASD's
functioning is its record on review by the SEC.
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States Supreme Court in Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States' 3
holding the NRA unconstitutional made this particular means of
self-regulation "impossible, '14 the benefits of such control became so
clear' 5 that the Investment Bankers Conference incorporated itself and
continued in existence in order to play a major role in shaping the
legislation which enabled the return of self-regulation.
The tenor of the legislation which became Section 15A of the
Securities Exchange Act of 193816 is best seen in the following statement from the Senate Report:
[It is] based upon cooperative regulation, in which the task
will be largely performed by representative organizations of investment bankers, dealers and brokers, with the Government
exercising appropriate supervision in the public interest,
and exer7
cising supplementary powers of direct regulation.'
Senator Maloney, sponsor of the Act, declared:
In the vast and highly ramified business in securities transacted
otherwise than on exchanges, this act is designed to effectuate a
system of regulation . .. in which the members of the industry

will themselves exercise as large a measure of authority as their
natural genius will permit.'"
In addition, it appears that a major reason for the decision to vest
regulatory power in a private trade group was an unwillingness to
proliferate the duties of the SEC with the concomitant mushrooming
size of, and number of personnel in, the Commission. With regard to
this reasoning perhaps one can only say that the view of the administrative process taken by Congress varies not simply from Session to
Session, but also from agency to agency.
Subsequent to passage of the Maloney Actsa and its incorporation
as Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act, year-long cooperation
between the SEC and the Conference produced by-laws which were
submitted to the members of the Conference for approval. The re13. Supra, note 1.
14. NASD Report 2.
15. Ninety per cent of the broker-dealers who replied to a questionnaire sent
out by the Conference approved of continuance of the Conference and agreed to support it financially. In addition, the SEC requested the Bankers Conference to participate in the drafting of legislation.
16. Ch. 677, 52 Stat.,1070 (1938).
17. S. Rep. No. 1455, pp. 3-4, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
18. Quoted at NASD Report 2. The securities business conducted on the stock
exchanges had already been placed under the control of industry organizations in
1934 by § 6 of the Exchange Act. See also, Comment, 48 YALE L.J. 633 (1939)
Maloney, Cooperative Regulation, 9 INv. BANKING 18 (1939).
1Sa. Siupra, note 16.
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sponse was favorable'" and the association submitted its application for
registration as a national securities association, as required by the new
law,2" on July 20, 1939.21

In allowing the Conference to register under its new name,
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., the SEC generally
approved of the provisions enacted by the Association 22 but found
only "minimum compliance" with section 15A in two provisions:
the efficacy of volunteer self-regulation 3 and the equitable allocation
of dues among members. 4 The SEC also noted that the Rules of
Fair Practice adopted by the NASD were well adapted to "eliminating
abuses which might well lead to the defrauding of investors" and
"to promote just and equitable principles of trade."25 It was also
held that the Rules of Fair Practice providing that members of the
Association could deal with non-member broker dealers only on the
same terms as members of the investing public, 26 and that "the giving
of concessions, discounts, or other allowances under certain circumstances, 27 do not appear to violate any of the prohibitions listed" in
section 15A(b) (7) .2' Finally, the SEC also questioned the lack of
rules providing for inspection of members' books or assuring the
solvency of a member. 29 Nevertheless, the application for registration
was granted - the only such application ever made.
The NASD, as presently constituted, consists of thirteen districts allocated generally according to geographical proximity and
co-extensive with the Federal Reserve Districts. Because of the
19. How favorable is another question, in view of the fact that of a membership of between 1500 and 1600, only 757 ballots were received of which 35 disapproved
in some way. NASD Report 3.
20. § 15A(a).
21. NASD Report 3.
22. In the Matter of Application by National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. for Registration as a National Securities Association, 5 S.E.C. 627 (1939).
23. Id. at 629.
24. Id. at 630.
25. Id. at 631.
26. NASD Manual D-13, Rule 25. This power is expressly provided for in
§ 15A(i) of the Exchange Act.
27. NASD Manual D-12, Rules 23 and 24.
28. The pertinent part of § 15A(b) (7) provides that registration shall not be
granted unless it appears that the association rules are designed "in general, to
protect investors and the public interest, and to remove impediments to and perfect
the mechanism of a free and open market; and are not designed to permit unfair
discrimination between customers or issurers, or brokers or dealers. .. "
The result of these rules has been that in the distribution of a new issue of
securities, and apparently in other securities transactions, members can and do give
a quarter point or more differential in price to other members which is not given to
nonmember purchasers.
29. Supra note 22, at 632. Both of these shortcomings are now cured. As to
the former, after a voluntary questionnaire system proved ineffective, the NASD now
uses itinerant examiners who are to have access to the books of any member and
whose visits are not warned of in advance. As to the latter, the NASD now
enforces the Federal Reserve Board margin requirements.
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jurisdictional limitations under which the Securities and Exchange
Commission operates," ° the NASD is similarly limited to those engaged
in the securities business via "use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or
to induce the purchase or sale of, any security otherwise than on a
national securities exchange."" 1 The By-Laws of the Association
further limit membership by requiring that the member be one
"authorized to transact and whose regular course of business consists
in actually transacting any branch of the investment banking or securities business. '"32 and, that he has been engaged in the securities
business for at least one year unless he passes a written examination
83
demonstrating technical proficiency in the securities business.
An additional qualification for membership requires that the
member not be under any disability arising out of previous expulsion
from the Association, revocation of his registration with the SEC, or
conviction of a crime with regard to practice of the securities business."4 If the applicant is denied membership by the local District
36
Committee,3 he has the right of appeal to the Board of Governors
and, ultimately, to the SEC.3 7 With regard to these qualifications on
eligibility for membership, the SEC has held that, in the absence of any
grounds for denial other than those which the SEC had previously
found inadequate as a basis for continuing the revocation of the
member's registration before the SEC as a broker-dealer, the NASD
is required to re-admit him to membership in the Association.38
30. See supra note 8.
31. § 15A(b)(1). Transactions effected on a national securities exchange are
exempted by definition of over-the-counter market. Furthermore, such transactions
are regulated by the exchanges themselves under the guidance of the SEC pursuant
to § 6 of the Exchange Act. (See note 18, supra.)
32. NASD Manual C-5, By-Laws of NASD, Article I, Section 1.
33. NASD Manual C-6, By-Laws, Article I, Section 2(b). The provision for a
written examination to test new entrants into the business is one of the most recent
achievements of the NASD.
34. NASD Manual C-5, By-Laws, Article I, Section 2(a).
35. NASD Manual C-10, By-Laws, Article I, Section 4(c).
36. Id. Section 4(d).
37. Id. Section 4(e). This is based on the general review power of the SEC,
§ 15A(g), and the membership clause of the Maloney Act, § 15A(b) (3). "Review of
denial of membership is usually brought under § 15A(b) (4) but if there is a question
whether, in fact, an applicant is subject to a disqualification, any unfavorable NASD
action may be reviewable under § 15A(g)." White, National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., 28 Gro. WASH. L. Rtv. 250, 253 (1959).

38. Lawrence R. Leeby, 25 S.E.C. 28 (1947). The Leeby decision is the leading
case in the area of SEC review of denial of membership in the NASD, an area
basically outside the scope of this article.
A recent case in this area is also interesting for the light it casts on the SEC
approach to denial of membership in the NASD. There - Matter of John Munroe,
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep J 76,766 (Exchange Act Release No. 6513) (1961) - the
member had been expelled from the NASD as well as suspended for five years from
the New York Stock Exchange for understating his income in his tax returns.
Apparently, though, his registration as a broker-dealer with the SEC was not revoked.
Then, three years after his expulsion, and while his Stock Exchange suspension was
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The local organization in each of the districts is the District
Committee,3 9 consisting of a number of members 40 who are active
participants in the business and are appointed for three-year terms.4
Elections for membership are held only if there is a contest for the
seats on the Committee ;42 such a contest can occur only if ten per cent
of the membership petitions for a vote on a name other than that
proposed by the district nominating committee (a group appointed by
the incumbent District Committee) .4 1 Votes in these elections are
allocated to member firms, rather than to individual representatives,
for the obvious reason of protecting the smaller firms from being
overborne in the selection of Committee members by the larger firms
having more registered representatives. One of the most important
criteria in the selection of Committee members is that there be "appropriate and fair representation . . . of the various sections of the District and of all classes and types of firms engaged in the . . . busi-

ness within such District."4 4 The result is that in a given District
there is likely to be representation of the large, multi-office national
member; the large, big-city member; the small, big-city member; and,
several members from small-town offices in various parts of the
District.4 5
The functions of the District Committee are basically two: (1)
to educate the membership in the objects of the NASD, and (2) to
report on the practical operation of the various rules and regulations
promulgated by the Association. 46 Furthermore, the chairmen of the
respective Committees act as an advisory council to the Board of
47
Governors to effectuate "maximum administration at the local level."
still effective, he successfully petitioned the SEC to order his re-admission into the
NASD. The grounds on which the SEC relied in ordering his readmission were:
(1) a pledge of future good behavior by the member; (2) the absence of any implication of fraud or negligence in the preparation of the income tax returns in question;
(3) a three-year suspension from membership in the NASD was sufficient punishment
in the light of all the facts.
See also, Cherrington, National Association of Securities Dealers, 27 HARV. Bus.
Rnv. 741, 757 (1949) ; Loss, SFCURITI's REGUIATION 770 (1951).
39. NASD Manual C-29, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 10.
40. The number is apparently proportional to the number of members in the
district, but may not exceed 12 under Section 10 of Article IV of the By-Laws.
41. NASD Manual C-29, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 10.
42. NASD Manual C-30, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 12(c).
43. It should be noted here that members of the Committee rarely succeed
themselves in office. By-Laws, Article IV, Section 12(a).
44. NASD Manual C-30, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 12(a).
45. District 8, for example, in 1960 included five members from Chicago, two
from Milwaukee, and one each from Benton Harbor, Mich., Minneapolis, Indianapolis,
Des Moines and Detroit.
46. NASD Manual C-33, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 19.
47. NASD Report 4.
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The controlling body of the NASD is a Board of Governors48
composed of members from each of the Districts in proportion to the
number of members in that District. Thus, five members of the Board
are from the New York District; three from the Midwestern District (which includes Illinois) ; three from the California District, and
one from each of the remaining districts for a total of twenty-one
members. 49 The term of office, 50 means of election,5" and power to
succeed themselves in office5" is the same for members of the Board
as for members of the District Committees. Finally, there is an executive director and a secretary, the only paid officers of the Association.5"
The Board is endowed with the over-all policy-making functions
of the Association but it is especially empowered to "adopt for submission to the membership . . . such By-Laws, rules and regulations,
make such interpretations, issue such orders and directions, and make
such decisions as it deems necessary or appropriate; and it may prescribe maximum penalties for violations

....

-

Within the scope

of these powers, the Board has regularly developed guide lines and
techniques for greater control and efficiency in "cooperative regulation of the over-the-counter business in the public interest and for the
protection of investors."55 In this sense, the Association has in fact
operated with regard to the over-the-counter market in a way similar to that in which the national securities exchanges have operated
with regard to their members and their members' dealings in listed
securities. 5 6

Among the more important devices developed by the Board for
protection of investors and the public interest are: (1) testing of
new entrants into the business; (2) supervision of sales literature
intended for investors; (3) publication daily of a National Quotations
Bulletin, known as the "pink sheet," which lists the bid and asked price
of a great number of the securities handled over-the-counter, thereby
48. NASD Manual C-25, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 2.
49. NASD Manual C-26, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 3.

50. Id. Section 4.

51. NASD Manual C-27, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 6.
52. Ibid.
53. NASD Manual C-35, By-Laws, Article V, Section 2. Members of the
Board of Governors are entitled only to "reasonable out-of-pocket expenses." NASD
Manual C-36, By-Laws, Article V, Section 7.
54. NASD Manual C-25, By-Laws, Article IV, Section 2.
55. In the Matter of Application by National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. for Registration as a National Securities Association, 5 S.E.C. 627, 628 (1939).
56. See, e.g., In the Matter of National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
19 S.E.C. 424, 483 (dissent) (1945); id. 20 S.E.C. 508, 512 (1945) where it is
suggested that this similarity in regulation by the exchanges and the NASD was the
purpose of Congress in passing the Maloney Act.

For a comparison of the two forms of regulation see Westwood & Howard,
Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 518 (1952).
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providing a single central source of information as to share prices;"
(4) development, interpretation and enforcement of a Uniform Practice Code which, in essence, consists of trade usages and customs involving the relationship of buying and selling brokers who are dealing
with one another in terse, technical, oral terms rather than under
expansive, written contractual terms; (5) examination of member
firms' books by professional examiners to determine compliance with
NASD and SEC rules;"8 and (6) promulgation of Rules of Fair
Practice.
Clearly, the Rules of Fair Practice, which more narrowly define
"just and equitable principles of trade," are the essence of the NASD
function, for these are the regulations under which a broker-dealer must
conduct his business in order to protect the investing public and for
violation of which he is held to account in an Association disciplinary
proceeding. 9 Accordingly, the remainder of this paper will be devoted
to an initial analysis of the Rules of Fair Practice and NASD disciplinary proceedings as reflected in SEC decisions which review
NASD action." ° The plan is first to examine the procedure in disciplinary proceedings, and then the substantive Rules of Fair Practice.
THE NATURE OF

NASD

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

As a condition of registration as a national securities association
the Maloney Act declares that:
[T]he rules of the association are designed to prevent fraudulent
and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to provide safeguards against unreasonable
57. In a disciplinary review proceeding prior to the establishment of this
service the SEC said: "We are convinced that the publication of bona fide over-thecounter quotations is desirable and necessary. Discussions with the NASD have been
under way for some time with a view to publishing quotations which would not
have the misleading character of those now published." Sherman Gleason & Co., 15
S.E.C. 639, 653, n. 28 (1944)..
58. These books and records must be always available for examination as a
condition of membership. Furthermore, these same books and records are subject
to the subpoena power of the SEC whose examiners may also scrutinize them.
59. See e.g., Grant, The National Association of Securities Dealers: Its Origin
and Operation, 1942 Wisc. L. REv. 597. In the Matter of National Association of
Securities Dealers, 20 S.E.C. 508, 510 (1945).

60. See note 12, supra. Concentration on, and limitation to, SEC review proceedings, although analogous to a discussion of American law based solely on United
State Supreme Court decisions, is necessitated by the fact that proceedings before the
NASD bodies are not made public and thus there are no records on which a study
can be based. The proceedings come to light only in the event of appeal to the SEC
whose proceedings are public. Reports of decisions are, however, made known to
members through selected reporting of untitled cases via the Association newspaper,
The NASD News. And, in one case, a request that the NASD proceedings be made
public was honored.
This paper also does not encompass those cases where the NASD petitions the
SEC to continue the membership of a broker-dealer or registered representative
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profits or unreasonable rates of commissions or other charges,
and, in general, to protect investors and the public interest, and to
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and
open market; and are not designed to permit unfair discrimination
between customers or issuers, or brokers or dealers, to fix minimum profits, to impose any schedule of prices, or to impose any
schedule or fix minimum rates of commissions, allowances, discounts, or other charges ;1

the rules of the .association provide that its members shall be
appropriately disciplined, by expulsion, suspension, fine, censure,
or any other fitting penalty, for any violation of its rules ;2
the rules of the association provide a fair and orderly procedure
with respect to the disciplining of members . . .3
In accordance with these provisions, the By-Laws of the Association authorized the Board of Governors to adopt for submission to the
'
membership "Rules of Fair Practice" 64
which include, among other
things, procedural rules for disciplinary proceedings and a schedule
of penalties.66 This By-Law also provides that the Board of Governors
shall have the power "To make and issue interpretations of all rules
of fair practice adopted." 7 The Rules of Fair Practice, including
twenty-eight rules governing substantive matters of business practice,6"
were found by the SEC, upon adoption, to be consistent with the
above-quoted provisions of section 15A."9 Similarly, four types of
penalties were approved :71 (1) censure; (2) fine not in excess of $500;
(3) suspension from the NASD; (4) expulsion from the NASD, or,
in the case of a registered representative, revocation of his registration.
A Code of Procedure for Handling Trade Practice Complaints was
also promulgated. 7 ' In addition to providing for jurisdiction and venue,
procedural rules covering such matters as filing of complaints and
answers, hearings, written decisions, and rights of appeal were set
out.
where the individual has previously been expelled by the SEC for misconduct. The
general principles of that area are stated in 22 S.E.C. 880 (1946). A few of the
leading cases are Greene & Co., 23 S.E.C. 429 (1946), Edward E. Trost, 25 S.E.C.
648 (1947), and Life Insurance Fund Management Co., 37 S.E.C. 376 (1956).
61. § 15A(b) (7) Exchange Act.
62. § 15A(b) (8) Exchange Act.
63. § 15A(b) (9) Exchange Act.
64. NASD Manual C-39, By-Laws, Article VII, Section 1.
65. Id., Section 3(b).,
66. Id., Section 3(c).
67. Id., Section 3(g).
68. NASD Manual D-5 to D-20, Rules of Fair Practice, Article III.
69. Loc. cit., supra note 22.
70. NASD Manual D-23, Rules of Fair Practice, Article V, Section 1.
71. NASD Manual E-1 to E-11.
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An alternative form of proceeding, the minor violation procedure, has also been established whereby the charged member admits
the violation, waives any hearing, and accepts a penalty not greater
than a fine of one hundred dollars. He also furnishes a statement
pledging future observance of and compliance with the rules.7 2 The
member's observance of this pledge is then kept under close scrutiny
by the District Business Conduct Committee,73 and breach of the
pledge is itself an unethical trade practice:
It is obvious that proper performance by the NASD of its duty
to secure adherence to just and equitable principles of trade for
the protection of investors requires that commitments made to it
be respected, especially where such commitments were the basis
for the withholding of sanctions because of prior violations and
their breach results in a further violation. The imposition on
Parker of a sanction for the breach of the commitment and the
repeated violation was clearly in order . .

..

The constitutionality of this delegation of power to the NASD
under the Maloney Act was first attacked in a petition to the SEC
urging that the Association had acted ultra vires its powers in adopting
a rule without first getting the approval of the membership.75 The
theory of this alternative line of attack was that the Association was
per se bad in that Congress could not constitutionally place such
broad powers of regulation in the hands of a private trade group.
The SEC, following the usual practice of administrative agencies
when faced with a challenge on constitutional grounds, declined to pass
on the issue, saying:
We do not here consider the petitioner's argument that Section
15A is unconstitutional, having consistently held that such a question may not properly be decided by an administrative tribunal.7"
No appeal was taken from the decision of the SEC in that case,
but the constitutional issue was subsequently raised in the first petition
to the courts to review an order of the SEC sustaining NASD ac72. NASD Manual E-5, Code of Procedure, Section 12.
73. NASD Manual E-9, Code of Procedure, Section 20.

74. Gilbert Parker, 34 S.E.C. 385, 389 (1952).
75. In the Matter of NASD, Inc., 17 S.E.C. 459 (1944).
here was the "5%

The rule at issue

policy" (see infra pp. 645-50).

76. Id., at 461, n. 5. But compare Boren & Co., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
76,718 (Exchange Act Release No. 6367) (1960) where the same discretion was
not shown by the SEC in deciding that an NASD Rule of Fair Practice was not
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment for failure to provide an ascertainable
standard of guilt. Of course, in Boren rhetoric was available to conceal the sub-

stantive issue involved

- the purpose of § 15A
R. H. Johnson & Co., 33 S.E.C. 180, 185 n.6 (1952)).
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tion." There, Judge Frank, writing for a unanimous court, gave
short shrift to the constitutional argument, holding:
In the light of the statutory provisions concerning (a) the
Commission's power, according to reasonably fixed statutory
standards, to approve or disapprove of the association's Rules,
and (b) the Commission's review of any disciplinary action, we
see no merit in the contention that the Act unconstitutionally
delegates power to the Association.7s
Unfortunately, the cases cited in support of this proposition are
at best inapposite.79 And, in fact, in two of the three cases cited the
Supreme Court expressly declared that the regulatory power in question was not in the hands of a private trade group. 0 Yet, it seems
safe to say that if the constitutionality of the delegation of power under
the Maloney Act were raised today before the United States Supreme
Court, it would be upheld. Despite the continued presence of conflicting, and apparently irreconcilable, lines of authority on the question
of the delegability of regulatory power to private groups,"1 it should
be recalled that in but two instances has the Court struck down the
delegation of power to an administrative agency. 2 Both those instances
involved the National Industrial Recovery Act and were subject to
vagaries in historical setting and litigation unlikely to be repeated. 3
Accordingly, if one may use as a measuring rod the standards applied
in the delegation of power to ordinary administrative agencies - a
77. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir., 1952) cert. denied 344 U.S.

855 (1952) affirming 33 S.E.C. 180 (1952).

78. Id. at 695.
79. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) ; Opp Cotton
Mills v. Administrator of Wage and Hour Division, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); Rice
v. Chicago Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947).
80. Rice v. Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 79, at 253, n.4 ("We therefore
have no attempt here to endow private groups with law-making functions.");
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, supra note 79, at 399, ("Since lawmaking is not entrusted to the industry, this statutory scheme is unquestionably
valid.")
81. Holding the delegation constitutional: Butt City Water Co. v. Baker, 196
U.S. 119 (1905) (Federal statute empowering miners to promulgate regulations as
to how mining claims should be established) ; St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S.
281 (1908)
(American Railway Association empowered by Congress to regulate
height of drawbars on freight cars) ; Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917)
(Municipal ordinance barring billboards unless consented to by neighbors).
Holding the delegation unconstitutional: Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S.
137 (1912) (Municipal zoning ordinance allowing two-thirds of the property owners
to establish set-back lines); Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116,
(1917)
(Municipal zoning ordinance prohibiting establishment of old folks home
without neighbors' consent) ; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(Power to set hours and wages delegated to producers and miners held bad
because "The power conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate
the affairs of an unwilling minority.
... )
82. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) ; Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, supra, note 1.
83. Stern, loce. cit, supra, note 2; Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power, 47 COLUm. L. REv. 359, 561, 569 et seq. (1947).
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tenable premise from which to begin by virtue of the very review
power in the SEC relied on by Judge Frank 4 - it seems plain that
the purpose of protecting the public and investors,85 and the standards
for achieving that purpose," are sufficiently clear on the face of the
statute to sustain the existence of the NASD under the United States
Constitution, subject to the watchful eye of the SEC.
District Business Conduct Committee.

A complaint may be filed by an aggrieved person against any
member of the Association with the District Business Conduct CommitteeY But, in fact, the overwhelming majority of charges are
brought by the District Committees of their own motion88 as a result
of examination of member books and records. Indeed, of the cases
reviewed by the SEC, in only one, Philips & Co. and Gerald G.
Bernheimer,8 9 was the complaint originally filed by a private party,
that is, a customer. Original jurisdiction for all complaints is in the
District Business Conduct Committee; venue is laid in the District
where the member firm has its principal office, or, at the office
where the violation occurred. 90 The complaint filed must be in writing
and "specify in reasonable detail the nature of the charges."'" This last
requirement has been interpreted by the SEC to mean that ". . . the
complaint . . . which sets forth the names of the customers, the
transactions of purchase and sale, and the amount of mark-ups charged,
9 2
was not deficient."1
Both for the purpose of determining whether a complaint should
be filed 3 and for the investigation of complaints,9 4 the Business Conduct
84. The SEC's power of review was similarly held to be a sine qua non of
approval of the NASD's amendment of its By-Laws in order to expand its jurisdiction to cover individuals as well as firms. In the Matter of NASD, supra, note 59,
at 516 (1945).
85. See pp. 618-19 supra.
86. Certainly "just and equitable principles of trade" is no more vague than
"just and reasonable rates" or "unfair methods of competition" which have already
been accepted by the Court. Professor Jaffe, in his article cited supra, note 83, suggests that the constitutional infirmity associated with the notion of delegation of
legislative powers is "in the field of federal administration .. . essentially. a caveat, a
hint of a reserved power. (47 CoLUM. L. Rtv. at 592). See also, Jaffe, Law Making
By Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. Rnv. 201 (1937).
87. NASD Manual D-21, Rules of Fair Practice, Article IV, Section 2.
88. Id., Section 3.
89. 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956).
90. NASD Manual E-1, Code of Procedure Sections 2 and 3.
91. NASD Manual E-2, Code of Procedure, Section 4.
92. R. V. Klein Co., 36 S.E.C. 146, 149 (1954); rev'd on other grounds Klein
v. SEC, 224 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1955); SEC order modified in R. V. Klein Co., 36
S.E.C. 419 (1955). The complaint here was based on excessive mark-ups in the
sale of oil royalties and the amount of mark-ups charged was a necessary part of the
complaint.
93. NASD Manual D-21, Rules of Fair Practice, Article IV, Section 5.
94. Id., Section 4.
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Committee has the power to require the member to submit a report on
the activities in question and open its books, records and accounts for
investigation. "[A] business conduct committee acting pursuant to
Article IV, Section 5, of the Rules of Fair Practice, does have the
power to compel the NASD members in its jurisdiction to make
periodic reports with respect to their trade practices""5 both to ascertain
what in fact the trade practices are, and also to determine, by comparison of the information supplied, whether some member or members
should be made the subject of unfair trade practice charges. Similarly,
the refusal of the member to supply such information during the course
of an investigation of a complaint is itself a violation of the Rules of
Fair Practice.9 Furthermore, the SEC sustained these investigatory
powers where the District Committee was charged, in one instance,97
with prejudice against the member and, in another instance,9" with
misuse of the information. As a ground for sustaining the NASD
powers in these cases, the SEC has ruled that a member's "remedy
against any misuse of the data by the committee lay in an appeal
from their actions," 9 not in a refusal to supply the data.' 0
But the NASD appears to have heeded the dictum of the court in
Otis & Co. v. NASD.'
There, a member firm had refused to supply
certain information to a District Committee on the ground that it
fell within the protection of the attorney-client privilege 2 and, after
the District Business Conduct Committee had imposed a two-year
suspension for this refusal, the member sued to enjoin the Association
from demanding the information and from enforcing the suspension.
The District Court, although dismissing the complaint for failure to
95. Sherman Gleason & Co., supra note 57, at 654. The NASD finding of violation here was not affirmed by the SEC, however, since this was the first such
questionnaire sent out by a NASD body. Parenthetically, the questionnaire was a
survey of mark-up practices which led to establishment of the "5% policy" (see
infra pp. 645-50) and the complaint against Sherman Gleason & Co. was based on
their pricing practice. It is also worth noting that this case was the first in which the
SEC was called upon to review NASD action.
96. Boren & Co., supra, note 76.
97. Sherman Gleason & Co., supra, note 57.
98. Boren & Co., supra, note 76. The information had been transmitted to
persons not involved in the investigation with the result that a representative under
investigation had lost his job at a bank.
99. Sherman Gleason & Co., supra, note 57, at 654.
100. The power of appeal to the SEC may be nonexistent, though, since the
Commission has jurisdiction only if affirmative disciplinary action is taken by the
NASD. See In the Matter of NASD, supra, note 59. And, of course, this does
not cure a situation like that in Boren & Co., supra, note 76, where the employer is
not subject to SEC regulation.
101. 84 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1949).
102. The firm also successfully withstood SEC inquiry into the correspondence in
question. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 176 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Rev'd per curiain, 338 U.S.
843.
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exhaust available administrative remedies (an appeal to the Board of
Governors was pending), declared:
[I]f the action of the District Committee is effective, the
[attorney-client] privilege of the communications here involved
would be destroyed. One would suppose that the Association
would be reluctant to give widespread [the] impression . . . that

it was exercising its disciplinary power so harshly until there
has been judicial determination that it has the right to do so. l"'
Accordingly, although the "remedy . . . lay in an appeal" to the SEC,

there are also the usual powers possessed by a court of equity to prevent
the NASD from over-extending its investigatory powers.
Possession of such broad investigatory powers coupled with the
power, sua sponte, to bring charges, led to difficulties for the Association in one instance where a dealer in oil royalty securities was
charged with taking mark-ups in excess of fifty per cent:
[T]he failure of the [District Business Conduct] Committee
to discipline him in 1950 justified Klein in believing that a 50o
mark-up did not violate the rules. We do not regard those
facts as constituting an estoppel. We do hold that they constituted
an interpretation of the Rules [of Fair Practice] on which Klein
reasonably relied. . . . There were no circumstances with respect to his conduct in 1950 . . . that distinguished it from that

for which he was expelled. (Klein v. S'EC, 224 F.2d 861, 864
(2d Cir. 1955) ).

But, neither the SEC nor the courts have since applied the Klein
rule to other facts. In the two cases raising the Klein issue before the
SEC, a distinction was drawn between oil royalties (involved in Klein)
and the type of security involved in each of those cases. This distinction
was based on the ground that, whereas no clear pricing policy had been
established by the NASD as to oil royalty securities prior to Klein,'
there was a clear policy as to the pricing of other securities. Accordingly, taking a fifty per cent mark-tip on oil royalties, in keeping with
customary practice, was different from taking large mark-ups in
other securities. Also, in one of the two aforementioned cases,
Mitchell Securities, Inc.,

°5

the SEC noted that for most of the

transactions in question there was no reasonable basis on which reliance, in the Klein sense, could be based. This was so because the
transactions had occurred before the NASD could have acted, and the
103. Otis & Co. v. NASD, supra, note 101, at 399.
104. The NASD has, since the Klein case, issued an interpretation with
respect to the applicability of NASD mark-up policy to transactions in oil royalty
securities. NASD Manual G-17.
105. 37 S.E.C. 178 (1956).
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NASD had moved relatively quickly upon discovering the pricing
policy of the member. In the second case before the SEC raising the
Klein issue, Midland Securities, Inc.,' the defence of reliance was
rejected on the ground that the mark-ups there were so excessive
as to preclude the reasonableness of any reliance on the failure of the
NASD to act.
Finally, the coup de grace was dealt Klein by the Second Circuit
in Boruski v. SEC, 289 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1961), where a dealer,
whose suspension by the NASD had been affirmed by the SEC, urged
on appeal that the Klein rule was applicable. The dealer argued that
the prior failure of the NASD to object to his bookkeeping methods
precluded basing a violation of the Rules of Fair Practice on those
methods now. In rejecting this argument the court held:
That case [Klein] was decided on the specific facts there presented - namely, implied approval of a 50% mark-up. Its holding
cannot be extended to implied approval of an inadequate bookkeeping system because of failure to object.1 °7
Although this decision in Boruski renders extinct the Klein rule,
there is yet something to be said for the underlying notion of the rule
which makes it not unlike the more common theories of estoppel.
Perhaps a restatement of Judge Frank's Klein rule in the following
terms would meet with a better reception by the SEC and the courts:
If the acts of the member are such that it could not reasonably believe
they constituted fair dealing, then the failure of the NASD to bring
disciplinary proceedings should not be a ground for defence. If,
however, the practices fall within an area where there is divergence of
opinion as to their propriety, then failure to initiate proceedings
promptly, after investigation, should be a good defence in the disciplinary proceedings.
A member who is the subject of a complaint has the right to file
an answer108 and have a hearing before the District Business Conduct
Committee' 9 at which he may be represented by counsel.11
The
SEC, taking into consideration the peculiar nature of private trade
106. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 76,727 (Exchange Act Release No. 6413) (1960).
107. Boruski v. SEC, 289 F.2d 738, 740 n.2 (2d Cir. 1961). One will note, of
course, that Klein itself was a Second Circuit decision.
108. NASD Manual E-3, Code of Procedure, Section 7.
109. Id. Section 8.
110. NASD Manual C-42, By-Laws, Article VII, Section 4. Members are
frequently reluctant to employ counsel for the purposes of such hearings (as is often
the case in commercial arbitration cases, and other trade quasi-judicial proceedings)
because of the possible adverse impression created and because of the overly legalistic
aura usually surrounding the appearance of counsel. See Sherman Gleason & Co.,
supra note 57, at 648.
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association regulation, has laid down the following standard for conduct of committee proceedings:
A District Committee, composed of active competitors of an
accused firm and engaged in the delicate task of policing their
own industry . . . must apply its experience and knowledge to
the evidence before it. . . . if the member [accused] offers evidence of relevant circumstances, the NASD must give such evidence proper consideration in determining whether there has
been a violation of its rules. And where, as in this case, it does
not appear that the mark-ups are in themselves clearly and substantially in excess of those customary in the vicinity, the NASD
has the affirmative duty of exploring the questioned transactions
and all pertinent circumstances before reaching any conclusion on
the reasonableness of the mark-ups."'
Association disciplinary bodies may, however, also consider the member's prior record of compliance with the Rules of Fair Practice in
deciding the punishment to be imposed.
The distribution of the evidentiary burden" 2 is such that the
District Committee, or other complainant, must first make out a prima
facie case of violation of the Rules of Fair Practice, whereupon the
burden of going forward with a defence shifts to the charged member." 3 In addition, the decision of the District Committee, to exonerate
the member or hold him guilty of a violation, must be in writing.
If the decision is that there was a violation, then the opinion must
contain a statement (1) of the acts or omissions to act of the member,
(2) of the specific rules violated, (3) that the acts constitute "conduct
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade""' 4 and (4) of
the penalty imposed." 5
The accused member is also required to bear such part of the
costs as is "fair and appropriate in the circumstances,"" ' 6 but assessment by NASD disciplinary bodies of the accused member's share of
costs has led to problems in several cases reviewed by the SEC.
In fact, reduction of costs is a recurring phenomenon in the cases.
In Managed Investment Programs,the Commission held:
111. Herrick, Waddell & Co., 25 S.E.C. 437, 447 (1947). See also note 112,
infra.
112. Compare, In the Matter of NASD, supra, note 75, at 468, where it is said:
"To speak of formal burdens of proof in the context of a disciplinary proceeding held
before a committee of the NASD may appear somewhat over-technical, since the
proceeding is heard by the accused member's fellow businessmen who are supposed to
bring their knowledge of trade practices to bear upon the case, and make their
determination in the light of their experience as technicians in the securities markets
rather than as lay jurors or legalistic judges."
113. Ibid.; Herrick, Waddell & Co., supra, note 111.

114. See Rule 1 of the Rules of Fair Practice, infra, p. 636.

115. NASD Manual E-4 and E-5, Code of Procedure, Section 11.
116. NASD Manual D-24, Rules of Fair Practice, Article V, Section 3.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss4/4

16

Rutter: The National Association of Securities Dealers: Continuing Govern
SUMMER

1962]

SECURITIES INDUSTRY

We believe that the scope of our review under the Act to determine whether a penalty imposed is excessive or oppressive includes
the determination whether an amount assessed as costs of the
proceedings is proper. Unless the costs are itemized we are un117
able to determine whether the costs were properly imposed.
For failure to itemize, the costs were set aside and the NASD was
then permitted to re-assess them.
More recently, the SEC has limited the amount of costs assessable again the accused member to $1,000. In the leading case of Boren
& Co.," 8 the District Committee had assessed costs in excess of
$7,500 which included counsel fees for the committee and the salaries
of employees engaged in handling the administrative and secretarial
aspects of the proceeding. In addition, the member's share of the
costs assessed on appeal to the Board of Governors was better than
$750 so that the total costs imposed on him amounted to over $8,300.
In refusing to affirm this portion of the Association's order, the SEC
emphasized that the limit on fines was $500"" and that the former
maximum on assessable costs, just recently dropped, had been $500.
It went on to rule that $1,000 "is the maximum that can reasonably
be assessed in the absence, as here, of a clear showing of deliberate
obstruction and delay by [the accused member]. '"12° In Gordon M.
Copp 2 the Commission stated the principle as follows:
[P]art of the costs incurred in disciplinary proceedings is to be
borne by the NASD, and . . . items of expenses which are not
directly attributable to the proceedings are not to be assessed
against a respondent.
But, the Commission did go on to note that in proceedings subsequent
to these decisions,
. . . the NASD has in conformity with those principles eliminated
from the assessment of costs the salaries of employees as well as
telephone and postage expenses.
It seems clear that the SEC has adopted the proper approach in
this ruling in view of three considerations. First, disciplinary pro.ceedings are not solely, or even primarily, intended as punitive devices;
rather, the main purpose is to educate the membership in the better
ways of conducting its business. Second, the dues and assessments
117. 37 S.E.C. 783, 791 (1957).

118. Supra, note 76.
119. NASD Manual D-23, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. V, Sec. 1.
120. Boren & Co., supra, note 76; see also Maryland Securities Co., Inc. (Exchange Act Release No. 6442) (1960).
121. CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 76,805 (Exchange Act Release No. 6644) (1961).
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paid by each member of the Association are intended to partially de-fray the expenses of such proceedings. Finally, inasmuch as the $500
limit on fines does exist, to permit the Committees to exercise their
ingenuity in imposing costs would make the limit on fines ineffective
and meaningless.
The Board of Governors.
The Board of Governors has appellate jurisdiction over decisions
of District Business Conduct Committees whether the District deci122
sion is one imposing a penalty or one dismissing the complaint.
Such review may be had by the Board on its own motion 123 within
thirty days of the District decision or upon appeal within fifteen days
12 4
by any party aggrieved by the penalty or dismissal below.
The exclusiveness of this means of redress from District Committee action - appeal to the Board of Governors, review by the SEC
and then to the Circuit Court of Appeal - has been upheld by both
the federal and state courts on the theory of federal preemption as
well as exhaustion of administrative remedies. In Otis & Co. v.
NA SD, 25 where a charged member sought an injunction against
enforcement of the District Committee's order suspending him from
membership, the District Court held that in the absence of "an appropriate subject with which this Court .. . may deal, the Court does

not have the power to grant the relief sought, and the complaint must
be dismissed."' 2 6 The basis for the holding was stated thus:
[T]he plaintiffs have not yet exhausted their remedy even before
the final authority of the Association. .

. Furthermore, it is

equally apparent that no final action adverse to the plaintiffs can
be effective until they have had an opportunity
to apply to a Court
12 7
of Appeals for a stay of such action.
122. NASD Manual E-6, Code of Procedure, Section 14.
123. The Board frequently exercises this power to "call up" cases when it is
felt that guidance in a particular area of practice is needed. See, for example, the
Public Service of Indiana cases (Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945)) discussed infra pp. 636-37 where the Board called up all seventy of the cases in which
fines were imposed by the various District Committees as well as a few of the
thirty cases in which the complaint was dismissed.
124. NASD Manual E-6, Code of Procedure, Section 14.
125. Supra, note 101.
126. 84 F. Supp. 395, 398 (D.D.C. 1949).
127. Ibid. It should be noted here that the NASD rules of procedure provide
that appeal to the Board of Governors automatically operates to stay the order
of the District Committee just as § 15A(g) of the Exchange Act provides that
appeal to the SEC automatically stays enforcement of the Board of Governors
orders. Stay of the SEC order pending review is discretionary with the Court of
Appeals.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss4/4

18

Rutter: The National Association of Securities Dealers: Continuing Govern
SUMMER

1962]

SECURITIES

INDUSTRY

Yet the caveat placed on this rule by the court subject with which this Court ... may deal" -

"an appropriate

makes plain that upon

a showing of, for example, denial of due process in the Association
proceedings, the federal courts will intervene.
A California District Court of Appeal has also applied the exhaustion of administrative remedies rule as a ground for denying relief
in Rudolph v. Fulton.128 There, a member of the NASD brought a
damage action against the Association for loss of business, property
and life' 29 on the grounds that the disciplinary proceedings brought
against him were intended to harass him and that the proceedings
were themselves unlawful and unfairly conducted. Without waiting
for a decision by the District Committee on remand from the Board
of Governors,' 8" member Rudolph brought the instant damage action.
The alternative, and apparently primary, ground for decision in the
Court of Appeal, was exclusive federal jurisdiction over "remedies
provided by the Securities Exchange Act." Reasoning that the Exchange Act provides for SEC review of Association disciplinary action
against members 13 ' and for judicial review of SEC decisions in the
Circuit Courts of Appeal," 2 the court said:
Therefore, if plaintiff is entitled to any relief because of the alleged
acts of the defendants in prosecuting him before the NASD,
such relief
can be obtained only in the federal Circuit Court of
1 3
Appeals. "

Similarly, the New York Supreme Court, although conceding
"some merit" to the contention of the NASD members that they would
be prejudiced at the Committee hearing by joinder of charges against
128. 178 Cal. App. 2d 339, 2 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1960).
129. Loss of life on the theory that because of actions of the NASD the
plaintiff member was unable to give his twelve-year old son parental attention,
wherefore the son committed suicide. (2 Cal. Rptr. at 809).
130. The decision, subsequent to entry of judgment in the trial court, was to
expel Rudolph. The earlier decision ordering expulsion by the District Committee
had been remanded by the Board of Governors for insufficient evidence to support
the decision.
131. Section 15A (g), Exchange Act.
132. Section 25, Exchange Act.
133. 2 Cal. Rptr. 807, 809 (1960).
Subsequently, Rudolph brought another action in damages against the NASD
which a different District of the California Court of Appeal declared to be "unintelligible." The court, however, affirmed the trial court's granting of a demurrer to
the complaint after construing the theory of action as follows:
It seems that the statements set forth (in the asserted first cause of action)
indicate an attempt to allege that although the defendant [NASD] is a nonprofit corporation under state laws, it has been conducting a profit-making
corporation under federal laws, and that, by reason thereof, the plaintiffs have
been damaged. . . . The allegations seem to indicate that plaintiffs commenced
this action merely as members of the public to recover damages by reason of
the alleged failure of defendant to conduct its business in accordance with
15 Cal. Rptr. 685, 686-7
Cal. App. 2d .
law." (Rudolph v. NASD, .

(1961)).
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.this matter falls within

an area pre-empted by the federal jurisdiction."' 1 4 Taken together,
these decisions of the state and federal courts seem to apply a primary
jurisdiction notion to federal administrative power over suits involving
the NASD, unless there is some extraordinary ground for interference, which ground (despite its extraordinary nature) is open only
to the federal courts. Yet the logic of this conclusion is not ineluctable.
Certainly the Rudolph cases in California provided no fair test of a
State court's willingness to interfere in NASD proceedings, and the
New York court's acceptance of the Rudolph rule in Barnett seems
to have come about without any close examination of the reason for
the rule. Also, even putting aside the effect of the court's dictum in
Otis

&

Co.,

8

the willingness of the District Court there to look

closely into the facts of the case to determine the "appropriateness" of
the subject for court action seems to indicate that when a more clearcut situation appears, judicial relief will be granted without hesitation.
The importance of timeliness in an appeal to the Board of Governors by an aggrieved party is shown in Royal Securities Corp. and
3 6 where the member had failed to appeal an adverse
John B. Milliken,"
decision by the District Business Conduct Committee within fifteen
days, as provided by the rules.' 37 Rather, twenty-one days after the
decision he requested an extension of time of the Board of Governors
in which to perfect his appeal. The extension was refused and the
Board declined to review on its own motion. On appeal to the SEC
it was held:
The NASD's rules relating to internal review, which we approved,
do not contravene Section 15A(g) of the Act as applicants contend. It is clearly proper to require that a statutory right to
review be exercised in an orderly fashion, and to specify procedural steps which must be observed as a condition to securing
the review.
[The] applicants' failure to exhaust their remedy of review within
the NASD pursuant to its rules precludes our review of the disciplinary action taken.1 8
Although the SEC finds support for this position in the Administrative Procedure Act,'1 9 it is plainly arguable that strict enforcement
134. Barnett & Co. v. NASD, 202

(1960).

N.Y.S.2d

136,

aff'd 204

N.Y.S.2d

79

135. Supra, pp. 623-24.

136. 36 S.E.C. 275 (1955).
137. Supra, note 124.
138. Supra, note 136, at 277.

139. 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1958) et. seq., esp. §§ 1007(a) and 1009(c).
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of a rule for the time of filing an appeal is inconsistent with the nature
of the proceedings before the NASD. 4 ' There is no argument to be
made here in terms of crowded dockets in view of the educative function of Board review and the willingness of the Board to call up cases,
sua sponte, to perform that function. Similarly, since the major purpose of the Association is to enforce "just and equitable principles of
trade," a member charged with acting in a contrary fashion should be
given a fair opportunity to draw on the Board's nation-wide expertise
as to what practices are, and what are not, "just and equitable." At
the least, it can be said that a fifteen day limit on the time for filing
appeals is too short.141

The power of the Board of Governors on review encompasses
not only the right to cancel, reduce or modify the punishment imposed by the District Committee but also the power to increase the
penalty or impose one ab initio. Three basic limitations exist, however - one jurisdictional in nature - on the power to impose or affirm
a penalty. First, the Board may not impose or affirm a penalty on
grounds other than those relied on by the District Committee below.
Accordingly, in Managed Investment Programs,' the SEC set aside
a Board penalty imposed on the ground of handling business while
not registered as a representative. The basis for the decision was
that the District Committee had predicated its finding of a violation on
the ground that the individual in question had breached an obligation
to his former employer in not reporting the transactions to, and
handling them through, the employer firm. Second, the penalty of
suspension may not be imposed for an indefinite period, as where the
Board had ordered a member suspended until it should pay for certain
securities. 4 Such an order is per se invalid. Third, and this in the
nature of a limitation on jurisdiction:
The NASD is not the proper forum . . . to decide the private

contract rights between the parties; its function under the Act
and its rules is to determine whether a member's conduct violates
ethical standards of' 1 44"commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade.'

140. See note 112, supra.
141. Section 15A(g) grants sixty days for filing with the SEC; the usual
period in the court systems is ninety days.
142. Supra, note 117.
143. Lerner & Co., 37 S.E.C. 850 (1957).
144. Id. at 855. See also Matter of NASD, supra, note 56 at 438 and Samuel
B. Franklin & Co., 38 S.E.C. 113 (1951). In the latter case, the SEC extended this
rule to cover its own jurisdiction saying (at 116) :
[Ilt is not our function, or that of the NASD . . . to decide private contract
rights between the parties. . . . [T]he question presented . . is whether the
member's conduct in question violates standards of fair dealing.
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Therefore, the Board of Governors was without power to order the
member to perform his contract (by accepting delivery of certain
shares of stock and paying for them within thirty days) on pain of
suspension until performed.
Securities and Ex'change Commission.
It is expressly provided in section 15A(g) that the SEC shall
have the power of appellate review over any disciplinary action taken
by a registered securities association against any member, either on
appeal by the aggrieved member or on its own motion. We have
already seen the importance of this power in finding the entire delegation of power constitutional. 4 The procedure for SEC review is
basically set out in section 15A(h) of the Exchange Act, 46 but
decisions by the SEC have put some gloss on the terms of that section.
A new, but relatively important, condition on the right to review
by the SEC is the amendment of SEC Rule X-15Ag-1147 which re-

quires the applicant for review to file a brief or statement in support
of his petition setting forth the basis of the appeal and the relief
sought. 14 The power to dismiss summarily a petition for failure to file
such a supporting brief or statement has already been exercised in
one case.

149

With regard to evidentiary matters the SEC has ruled:
The NASD's interpretation and application of its rules are entitled to great weight by the Commission . . . its interpretation

should certainly not be disturbed where, as here, it is consistent
with decisions of this Commission involving similar situations.' 50
In addition, the SEC has narrowly limited the right to introduce
evidence in the review proceeding which was not of record in the
NASD proceedings, despite the power, under section 15A(h), to
consider "such other evidence as it may deem relevant." The general
rule is stated in Herrick, Waddell & Co.:
145. Supra, pp. 620-22.
146. Of critical importance is the condition that the SEC may exercise its
review power only if affirmative disciplinary action is taken by the NASD. See
note 100, supra.

It should be noted, however, that the Commission has independent power,
under § 15 of the Exchange Act, to take disciplinary action against brokers and
dealers registered with them, including the power to expel them from the NASD.
147. This Rule, promulgated under Section 15A(g) of the Act, further delineates
the procedure to be followed in petitioning the SEC for review of an NASD decision.
The Rule also codifies the Herrick, Waddell rule on the admissibility of new
evidence before the SEC. (See, infra, pp. 632-33).
148. Exchange Act Release No. 6606 (1961).
149. Stanford Corp. and George W. Stanford, Exchange Act Release No.
6655 (1961).
150. R. V. Klein Co., supra, note 92 at 149.
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In general .. .the Commission will not open the record to receive

further evidence except in a case where it is shown that such
evidence is relevant to the issues raised but could not be presented in the original proceedings. 1 1
In the subsequent decision setting aside the NASD action against
Herrick, Waddell, the SEC took the unusual course of remanding
the case to the NASD for the admission of additional evidence in
lieu of bringing in the evidence before the Commission, saying:
We have concluded that it is more in keeping with the legislative scheme for supervised industry self-regulation embodied in
Section 15A that the NASD itself undertake to cure the inadequacy of the evidence presented by it and the errors made in relating the evidence to its rules as interpreted by it.' 52
Recently, the rationale of the SEC rule for refusing to admit
additional evidence unless it could not be presented in the NASD
proceedings, was restated as being a means not "to impair the efficacy
of the proceedings before the NASD."' 58 Upon first reading this
rationale for limiting the admissibility of additional evidence, the
skeptic will ask how the admission of further evidence before the
SEC could impair the efficacy of NASD proceedings. The rationale
for remand to the NASD when additional evidence is needed provides
the hint to answering the skeptic's question: the primary responsibility for regulation of NASD members is vested in the Association;
therefore, members charged with breach of the established rules, as
well as the Association itself as complainant, should be impelled to
present fully their positions as to just and equitable practice in order
that the Association may fulfill this primary responsibility.
The nature of the review power exercised by the SEC in these
cases has been best stated in the dissenting opinion of the Public
Service of Indiana cases:
Our role under Section 15A(h)(1) is an unusual one for a
reviewing body because we are determining whether certain con151. 23 S.E.C. 301, 303 (1946). See also R. A. Holman, Exchange Act Release No. 6631 (1961).
152. Herrick, Waddell & Co., supra note 111, at 449. Note that it was the
Association here, and not the member, who sought to adduce additional evidence
before the Commission.
The SEC also followed the remand procedure in an unreported case where a
member, charged with making unsuitable purchase recommendations to his customers, was prevented from introducing, at the NASD proceedings, letters sent to
the customers advising against such trading and refusing to conduct the transactions for them. On remand, the Board of Governors dismissed the complaint. (See,
26 SEC ANN. REP. 120, n.86 (1961)).
153. Gerald M. Greenberg and Robert Leopold, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 76,684
(1959), appeal dismissed. Exchange Act Release No. 6320 (1960).
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duct is consistent with just and equitable principles of trade, not
whether it violated law . . . that is to say, we are applying to

the NASD action in disciplining its own members certain limited
tests specified in the statute. Hence I think it is a mistake to deal
with such problems as if they were problems of law violation.'
We have already seen above that NASD and SEC action is taken
with regard to principles of trade and standards of fair dealing rather
than with regard to private contract rights. 5 This conception of its
role in reviewing NASD disciplinary action accords with the scope of
regulatory power it concedes to itself and the NASD and, more
importantly, with the role of an administrative agency as one of filling
up the blanks in the legislative grant of power.
The scope of SEC review was declared by the Second Circuit in
R. H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC: 5 ,
We think that those provisions [§15A(h)(1)] call for (1) de
novo findings by the Commission; (2) the hearing by the Commissioner of further evidence if necessary; and (3) an independent
157
decision by the Commissioner as to the charges and penalty.
The SEC, in turn, has held that it has power to look into the
proceedings of the District Committee even if the issue was not preserved on appeal to the Board of Governors but is raised before
the Commission:
We do not believe that the provision of internal review before
the national committee forecloses [our] examination of the district procedure. The extent to which that procedure is an open
issue before us depends, among other things, on the extent to
which the facts show a lack of due consideration of the merits
by the district committee and the extent to which proceedings
before the national committee are curative of the errors below.'" 8
An example of the pragmatic need for such power (which is not to say
that there is no theoretic need for it) appeared in a case where the
Board of Governors had been equally divided on the merits:
154. Matter of NASD, supra,note 56, at 480.
155. Supra, note 144 and text thereat.
156. Supra,note 77, at 695.
157. The contrast between this court's view of the Commissioner's duty to hear
additional evidence and the actual exercise of that duty, discussed supra p. 633,
casts some doubt on the legitimacy ofI the Commission's practice in this area.
Yet, if one agrees that the NASD ought to be primarily responsible for regulation
of its members, there is little doubt that the Commission's rule is preferable. In
addition, this statement by the court is purely obiter dictum since the scope of the
SEC's review power was not at issue and, in any event, the Commission's Rule
X-15Ag-1 was in all probability not called to the court's attention.
158. Sherman Gleason & Co., supra, note 57, at 649.
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The failure of the Board of Governors to elaborate its opinion or
to indicate wherein it was unable to reach a decision ...makes
it necessary for us to rely entirely on the opinion of the District
Committee in reviewing the proceeding. 5 '
Finally, in permitting the NASD to amend its By-Laws so as to
bring individual representatives under the direct control of the Association, the SEC ruled: " . . . we have the same scope of supervisory

power over NASD action respecting representatives as we do over its
action respecting members ....
""'
The power of the SEC on review is more restricted than that of
the Board of Governors in one respect - the SEC may not increase
the penalty, as may the Board, but it may reduce or set aside a penalty
if it is found to be "excessive or oppressive, having due regard to the
public interest." " ' If the penalty is not found excessive or oppressive,
the SEC dismisses the appeal.
Judicial Review.
In concluding this analysis of the procedural aspects of NASD
proceedings, the scope of judicial review accorded appeals from SEC
dismissals of appeals from Board of Governors decisions remains to
be noted. Succinctly stated, the rule is that the court will "review
the action of the SEC, not that of the NASD, ... we consider errors
in the proceedings of the NASD only if and to the extent that they
62
infected the Commission's action by leading to errors on its part.'
Although this rule seems to mean that the Association is generally not
subject to judicial scrutiny even in those cases which go all the way
to the circuit courts of appeal, it is clear that this rule is not literally
applied; in each of the cases reported the courts have in fact passed
on the NASD rule in question as applied to the facts of that case. The
apparent meaning of this broad statement, then, is that the courts will
consider NASD rules and practices as they are, case by case, put in
issue; but the courts will not attempt to determine, generically, what
are and what are not "just and equitable principles of trade." Surely
this approach cannot be said to differ materially from that taken in
review of the ordinary administrative agency.
159. Herrick, Waddell & Co., supra, note 111, at 439, n.1.
160. Matter of NASD, supra, note 59, at 518.
161. § 15A(h) (2), Exchange Act.
162. Klein v. S.E.C., 224 F.2d 861, 864 n.5 (2d Cir. 1955). Compare the SEC's
power to look through the Board of Governors proceedings and pass on those at the
District level.
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THE SUBSTANTIVE RULES OF FAIR PRACTICE

The NASD has adopted twenty-eight Rules of Fair Practice relating to the manner in which a member is to conduct his business. It is
sufficient to note here that all of these rules sound in rule 1 : "A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of
commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.' 6 3 As
written, this is a fairly innocuous rule, but surely it is also one subject
to a wide divergence of interpretation. In considering the cases that
have been appealed to the SEC it seems most convenient to divide
them into three categories: (1) cases dealing with relations among
fellow members of the over-the-counter fraternity and the Association;
(2) cases dealing with a member firm's relationship with its employees; (3) cases dealing with sales relations with investors.
Intra-FraternityCases.

Undoubtedly the most important and best known case within this
category is the one dealing with the Public Service of Indiana bond
offering. 64 Stated simply, the problem there was that the NASD was
attempting to impose penalties on member firms which had sold the
bonds in question at prices lower than the stabilization price while
participating in the initial distribution.6 The public offering of these
bonds ran into serious difficulty because of the events immediately
preceding World War II, with the result that the distribution took
much longer than was normal, and the price of the bonds broke almost
immediately upon initiation of the offering. Due to the price fluctuations downward, 107 members of the NASD, acting both as underwriters and as part of the selling group of dealers, sold bonds at
prices below the agreed distribution price. Over one hundred complaints were filed in the various districts, in seventy of which District
Business Conduct Committees imposed modest fines. The Board of
Governors called these seventy cases up for review, plus several which
had been dismissed, and affirmed the imposition of fines. Then the
SEC, on its own motion, called up for review six cases deemed to
be representative of the entire number. The issue on appeal was
whether the NASD could, by means of the Rules of Practice, enforce
the contractual price maintenance term intended for purposes of efficient
distribution. The SEC held that it could not and set aside the fines.
163. NASD Manual D-5. The close similarity between this language and that
oi Section 15A is obvious.
164. Matter of NASD, 19 S.E.C. 424 (1945).
165. For a thorough discussion of "stabilization" see 3 Loss, SiEcuRITIS
REGULATION, ch. 10B (2d ed., 1961).
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In its holding, the SEC narrowly limited itself to the very issue
stated - in fact, it stated that if squarely presented with the issue it
would not prohibit price maintenance provisions just as it did not
prohibit stabilization via open market purchases but found the
NASD interpretation improper in two respects. First, it constituted
an attempt on the part of the Association to enforce private contract
rights by way of disciplinary proceedings, a practice which we have
already seen is ultra vires the power of the NASD and the SEC. 166
Second, such an enforcement policy would run directly counter to that
portion of section 15A(b) (7) which requires that association rules
not "impose any schedule of prices." It was also noted, in rejoinder
to an NASD argument, that enforcement of price maintenance via
disciplinary proceedings was not necessary in view of the fact that
court enforcement of the respective contract rights was available. A
dissenting commissioner felt that breach of such an agreement was
conduct inconsistent with rule 1, but he added such conditions to his
proposed rule that it seems clear, on the facts of this case, that there
was no violative behavior. 16 7 This case is also interesting inasmuch
as it underlines the chief inducement to membership in the NASD.
Section 15A(i) of the Act expressly prohibits any association member
from dealing with any nonmember except at the same prices and on
the same terms and conditions as with a member of the general public,
whereas a "dealer's discount" or special terms may be granted a brother
member of the association.
As a result of this section it is virtually impossible for a dealer
who is not a member of the NASD to participate in a distribution of important size. Since the major underwriting firms of the
country are members of the NASD, non-member firms are16 practically excluded from participating in this type of business.
166. Supra, note 144 and text thereat.
167. One of the conditions was that the breach be "one for which fair justification or equitable excuse does not exist." (Matter of NASD, supra, note 164, at 482).
Clearly, the break in the market provided a "fair justification or equitable excuse."
168. Supra, note 164, at 441. Of course, the same statutorily permitted price
discrimination maintains in the sale of securities other than in an initial distribution.
The anti-trust ramifications of these stabilization agreements was argued before
the Commission here also. (The Dept. of Justice was permitted to intervene in
these proceedings as an interested party, over the objection of the NASD (15 S.E.C.
577). All the commissioners agreed that these agreements were not unlawful under
the Sherman Act, the majority taking eighteen pages of the printed report (19
S.E.C. 446-464) to conclude that such agreements are not per se unlawful and the
"reasonableness" of the agreement should be judged by:
. . . the size of the group in relation to the size of the issue, the suppression of
competition in bidding or negotiating for the business, and the duration of a
syndicate dictated by the manager and major underwriters.
See also, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Although outside the scope of this paper, it might be well to note that this
statutory power of price discrimination under § 15A(i) has been exempted from the
reach of the antitrust law by § 15A(n), according to the dictum of several cases.
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This category of cases also includes the other two cases where
NASD penalties were set aside because there was an attempt to enforce
private contract rights. In the first, Lerner & Co.,'( 9 Lerner had
agreed to purchase a large block of shares from another member firm
on condition that he get the shares along with their proxies so as to
obtain representation on the board of the issuer. The selling firm
procrastinated in final delivery until the day after the issuer's annual
stockholders' meeting whereupon Lerner refused to take delivery of
the shares. Complaints were filed against both the selling firm and
Lerner in their respective districts. A joint hearing was held in a
neutral district where the selling firm was censured, fined $1,000 and
assessed costs. Lerner was only censured. Upon remand to the respective home districts, Lerner's district concurred in the censure, but the
selling firm's district declined to follow the decision of the third
district. The Board of Governors, reviewing on its own motion,
reduced the selling firm's fine to $500 and ordered Lerner to pay for
the shares (6000 at 28; 100 at 26%) within thirty days or face suspension from membership until he did pay. As noted above, the SEC
held this order invalid per se because it involved a suspension for an
indefinite period. Furthermore, the NASD order was deemed improper as an attempt to enforce private contract rights through a
disciplinary proceeding.
In the second case, 170 Samuel B. Franklin & Co. had sold and
delivered 500 shares to another member firm which was a specialist in
the security. Some twenty days later the buyer demanded that Franklin
take back the shares since they were "old" ones which had been
subject to a "reverse split," a fact which Franklin was not likely to
know since the company was not a specialist in the security. Franklin
did take back the shares and offered to rescind the entire contract. The
buyer refused because there had been a rise in the market price of the
security, but suggested that Franklin not replace the shares immediately since they were over-priced, which suggestion Franklin followed.
When the price continued to rise and there was an eight per cent stock
dividend, the buyer firm finally "bought-in" 540 shares to cover the
contract and filed a complaint, after reneging on an earlier decision to
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 227 n.60 (1940)
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange, 196 F. Supp. 209, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)). Section 15A(n)
provides:
If any provision of this section is in conflict with any provision of any law of
the United States in force on June 25, 1938, the provision of this section shall
prevail.
169. Supra, note 143.
170. See supra, note 144.
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submit the case to arbitration. The District Committee found a violation of rule 1, censured Franklin and assessed costs; the Board of
Governors affirmed the censure and further required that Franklin
make good the loss to his buyer within thirty days or face further disciplinary proceedings. The SEC set aside the penalty on the grounds
that there was no evidence that Franklin "sought to evade responsibility arising from the delivery of old certificates .. . [and thus his]

conduct was not inconsistent with 'just and equitable principles of
trade' within the meaning of the Rule."
The rulings in these three cases seem clearly to establish that
the NASD, even when viewed as a private trade organization, is a
strange beast. The Association lacks the power to force conformity
on its members in either price or product; it may only establish minimum standards for customs and practices. But it may not enforce
certain core practices, such as fulfilling contractual obligations, by
requiring specific performance. And, finally, it must ever have in mind
the "public interest" over and above the "trade" interest.
A major problem in the relationship between member firms and
the Association is the failure of many members to maintain proper
records. This is an affirmative duty imposed by Rule 21 of the Rules
of Fair Practice which, although rarely cited in the SEC opinions, is
the basis for finding many violations. A very recent decision of the
SEC has stated the rationale of this rule as follows: "[Proper maintenance of current books] is a keystone of the surveillance of registrants
and NASD members with which we and the NASD are charged in
the interest of affording protection to investors." '7
Member Firm - Registered Representative Relationships.
It is expressly provided in Article XV, Section 2 of the By-Laws
of the NASD that no member firm of the Association shall permit any
person to transact any branch of the business in any capacity unless
such person is registered with the Association." 2 This control over
the individual representatives was acquired by the NASD in order to
171. Midland Securities, Inc., supra, note 106. The Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit, in Boruski v. SEC, supra, note 107, has recently upheld the
SEC's dismissal of an appeal where the violation of the NASD Rules of Fair
Practice was predicated in part on the member's failure to maintain proper books.
In the most recent case involving a failure to maintain proper books and records it
appears that, even after entry of a consent judgment in an injunction suit brought by
the SEC regarding the same acts of omission, a District Committee ordered expulsion
of the member from the NASD. (Robert H. Davis d/b/a Colonial Investors, CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 76,824 (1962)). The Board of Governors, however, reduced the
penalty to a six-month suspension and the SEC, in turn, to a twenty-day suspension,
in view of "the measures taken by applicant to prevent future violations and the
restriction of his activities which will reduce the extent of record keeping involved."
172. NASD Manual C-53.
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carry out more effectively the purposes of section 15A by imposing
direct responsibility on the individual employee for carrying out the
principles of fair dealing.
Managed Investment Programs173 is the only review case where a

penalty was imposed for a representative's transaction of business while
unregistered. In that case the individual was between jobs, having just
left the employ of one member firm and awaiting registration with
the Managed Investment Programs firm (of which he became the
principal partner), when two customers who had dealt with him in
the context of his former employment requested that he transact certain purchases for them. Ie completed the transactions for them
through the agency of the Programs firm and received commissions
for the sales. The District Conduct Committee found that he had
violated rule 1 in failing to report the buy orders to his former employer and revoked his registration; the Board of Governors reduced
the penalty to censure and imposed a $300 fine on the ground that he
had violated the registration requirement. The SEC did not pass on
the substantive merit of finding a violation, but set aside the penalty
on the procedural ground that the Board had imposed a penalty on
17 4
grounds not raised below.

Although the necessity for NASD control over individual representatives is obvious - and thus the principle, if not the application
to the instant facts, of the Board of Governors decision is proper - it
seems doubtful whether the principle enunciated by the District Committee in this case is desirable. Once a representative terminates an
employment relationship in order to work for a different firm, there
seems to be no satisfactory reason for preventing him from servicing
investors whom he first contracted at the old firm, even conceding that
"stealing" customers is a serious problem for many firms when employees leave. Furthermore, the relation between some investors and
their "broker" is a very personal one so that the customer is better
protected by dealing through this trusted representative who is between
jobs and thus unregistered, than if he were remitted to a registered
stranger. That the investors here sought out the representative in
question may be the best evidence of the personal trust placed in one's
broker.
Failure to register individuals as representatives is also a common
cause of violations of the above By-Law. Two recent decisions on
this problem have turned on the same factor. A 1949 resolution of
173. Supra, note 117.
174. Supra, p. 631.
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the Board of Governors stated that "wilful" failure to register representatives as required by Article XV of the By-Laws was a violation
of rule 1.17 In Boren & Co., it appeared that the member firm had
failed to register a number of representatives due to the negligence of
an experienced employee. The District Conduct Committee found no
"wilfullness" in the failure to register, but nevertheless found a violation on the grounds that wilfullness was unnecessary; the Board of
Governors affirmed. The SEC, however, set aside this decision saying,
"The NASD cannot dispense with a requirement which it has itself
prescribed for finding a violation of its rules in this respect."' x17 Two
months later, in Midland Securities, Inc., 177 the SEC set aside another
NASD decision on identical grounds.
Rule 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice imposes the affirmative duty
on member firms to supervise the activities of registered representatives associated with the office.' 78 Thus, in Graham & Co.,' 79 a violation was found by the NASD, and affirmed by the SEC, where salesmen's purchase orders were not endorsed by an executive of the firm,
in contravention of rule 27(a). In another case, Earl L. Combest, s0
which arose when rule 27 contained the word "salesman" rather than
"registered representative" as it now does, the appellant argued that
since the violations were perpetrated by his copartners in the firm he
should not be disciplined under the rule. In affirming a $2,500 fine
(but setting aside his suspension) the SEC ruled:
[T]he fact that B.E. Prugh and Coenx had official titles and
owned an interest in the member [firm] did not relieve the
member of responsibility under Section 27 with respect to the
transactions effected by those persons as salesmen; . . .applicant,

as the chief executive officer who was daily active in the business,
was charged with that responsibility ...."'
It is clear from this decision that all individuals who act in a
selling capacity are subject to the same rules as the newest salesman in
the office. The appropriateness of this uniform regulation is especially
apparent here, since it usually takes some experience in the securities
175. This resolution was promulgated under the authority of the Board to
make and issue interpretations of the Rules of Fair Practice. NASD Manual C-40,
By-Laws, Article VII, Section 3 (a).
176. Boren & Co., supra, note 76. It is interesting to note, however, that by
virtue of the employee's being "experienced," application of ordinary tort and contract notions would make this failure to register "wilful."
177. Supra,note 106.
178. NASD Manual D-18 and D-19.
179. 38 S.E.C. 314 (1958).
180. 35 S.E.C. 623 (1954).
181. Id. at 626.
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business before transactions intentionally harmful to an investor's interest can be carried off successfully.
The scope of this duty to supervise is seen in two cases. In one,
Gilbert Parker,1 82 it appears that the individual whose registration was
revoked by the NASD was an absentee secretary-treasurer. The firm
had formerly been subject to proceedings by the Association for several
violations relating largely to improper hypothecation of customer's
securities, other forms of financing violations, and exceeding the aggregate indebtedness rule. In accordance with the minor violation procedure, the firm, Parker and other officers sent pledges to the District
Conduct Committee that there would be no further violations. However, Parker continued to be absent from the office and the firm again
exceeded the 2,000 per cent aggregate indebtedness rule. NASD proceedings were initiated, resulting in revocation of registration for
Parker and the other officers. On appeal, Parker argued that due to
his absence from the daily operations, and because of the express assurances given him by the operating executives, his registration ought not
to be revoked. The SEC summarily dismissed this contention:
• .. Parker was grossly remiss in his obligation in not keeping
fully informed as to the practices of the company to insure that
there was compliance with 8 the net capital and other requirements
applicable to the business.

3

In the second case on the scope of the duty to supervise, R.H.
Johnson & Co.,' 84 the member firm was a large New York firm with
branch offices in Boston. A new representative, taken on in the Boston
office, brought with him several accounts, in one of which he subsequently traded excessively."" The District Business Conduct Committee found that the individual representative, the firm, and two partners in the Boston branch office were in violation of rule 1 and imposed penalties; the Board of Governors reduced the penalties of the
Boston partners, affirmed the penalties as to the representative and the
firm, and further found that the principal partner of the firm, who
worked out of New York, was also in violation of the rule. On appeal
to the SEC, it was argued by the principal partner that he ought not
be subjected to discipline since the two Boston officers were partners
and since he was rarely in the Boston office. In dismissing his appeal,
the SEC held that "effective supervision by the New York office or
182. Supra, note 74.

183. 34 S.E.C. 385, 388 (1952).
184. 33 S.E.C. 180 (1952).

For the subsequent history of the case see notes 76

and 77, supra.

185. For the meaning of "excessive trading" see infra, pp. 652-53.
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Johnson over the activities of the Boston office was lacking."'"" The
control exercised by the New York office was evidenced by the fact
that all permanent books, records and accounts were kept there and
the required approval of transactions was given in that office. Furthermore, "[Johnson's] responsibility would be more, rather than less,
clear, if [the two Boston officers] held a partnership status ....

[T]he

supervisory functions of [the two officers] were limited and that fact
together with Johnson's control of applicant [firm] are significant in
determining whether Johnson was individually responsible for [the
violations] ... 187
The implications of the decisions in these two cases are obvious:
the duty to supervise employed representatives is not relaxed merely
because the responsible officer of the firm has other duties in other
places. That is to say, the standard of supervision required of the
multi-office member firms is equally as high as that required of the
two-or three-man office.
Finally, in Earl L. Combest,81 the applicant representative admitted violation of rule 24 (which prohibits giving discounts or selling
concessions to any one other than a fellow member) in paying about
half of his commissions for transactions in the shares of a mining
company to an officer of that company. The NASD, however, suspended his registration for two years and imposed a fine of $2,500 on
the basis of a violation of both rule 24 and rule 1. But the SEC, in
setting aside the suspension, apparently found only a violation of rule 1
since it made no adverse findings as to rule 24. In any event, no matter
on which rule the violation was predicated, it is clear that payment of
commissions to one other than an association member is prohibited.
Relationships with the Investing Public.
In keeping with the purposes of the Maloney Act, the great
majority of NASD disciplinary cases have predictably been concerned
with transactions between an Association member and an investor.
Similarly, most of these cases have turned on the question of what is
a fair profit for a broker-dealer when he sells or purchases securities.
Soon after the NASD was registered, but before the Association
had begun active enforcement of its rules, the SEC had before it
what appears to be the first case where the quantum of profit (the
186. 33 S.E.C. 180, 186 (1952).
187. Id. at 185.
188. Supra, note 180.
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mark-up or spread) was in issue. In Duker & Duker,'9" a firm had
realized profits of thirty per cent and thirty-six per cent on transactions of $1,506 and $572 respectively. In addition to finding a violation of Rule X-15C1-4 - promulgated by the SEC under the Exchange Act - for failure to notify the customer whether acting as
principal or agent, 190 the SEC laid down the following basic principle
as to profits:
Inherent in the relationship between a dealer and his customer
is the vital representation that the customer will be dealt with
fairly, and in accordance with the standards of the profession.
It is neither fair dealing, nor in accordance with such standards,
to exploit trust and ignorance for profits far higher than might
be realized from an informed customer. It is fraud to exact
such profits through the purchase or sale of securities while the
representation on which the relationship is based is knowingly
false. This fraud is avoided only by charging a price which bears
a reasonable relation to the prevailing price or disclosing such
information as will permit the customer to make an informed
judgment upon whether or not he will complete the transaction.
This opinion is not, of course, to be taken as a condemnation of all profits realized by dealers. Our decision is merely that
a dealer may not exploit the ignorance of his customer to exact
unreasonable profits resulting from a price which bears no reasonable relation to the prevailing price. The reasonableness of
the profit charged can be determined only on the basis of the
individual facts of each case.' 9'
Rule 4 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice'" further defines
the principle as applicable to Association members: When acting as
principal (dealer) in the transaction, "he shall buy or sell at a price
which is fair, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, including market conditions with respect to such security at the time
of the transaction, the expense involved, and the fact that he is entitled
189. 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939). This was not a review of NASD proceedings (the
decision permitting the Association to register had been handed down but four months
before), but rather was an independent SEC proceeding brought under Section
15 (b) of the Exchange Act.
190. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-4 (1949). The firm had acted as agent (broker) for
the customer in the sale of certain shares, had then used part of these proceeds to buy
in shares in its own name as principal (dealer), and then re-sold the newly purchased shares to the customer's account at the stated profit margin.
Failure to reveal whether acting as principal (dealer) or agent (broker) is also
a violation of Rule 12 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. (NASD Manual D-8).
The Second Circuit has recently upheld the finding of a violation of this Rule where
the member's compliance consisted of the statement in its letterhead, "Lic. Mutual
Funds Investment Broker." (Boruski v. SEC, supra, note 107, at 740).
191. 6 S.E.C. 386, 388-89 (1939). The implied representation theory has since
been expounded in numerous cases. See e.g., Charles Hughes & Co., v. SEC, 139
F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied 321 U.S. 786, (1944).
192. NASD Manual D-6.
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to a profit"; when acting as agent (broker) for the customer he shall
not charge "more than a fair commission or service charge," taking
into consideration the same factors. The first disciplinary proceeding
taken to the SEC for review, Sherman Gleason & Co.,193 involved,
inter alia, a charge that rule 4 had been violated. The SEC, in dismissing the appeal as to this charge, ruled:
It would have been helpful on review if the NASD had expressed
its reasons for rejecting Gleason's defences regarding his compliance with local business practices and the smallness of his annual
net profit. We do not, in this case, attempt to construe the meaning of the NASD's fair price rule [Rule 4]. However, no matter
what theory of the rule is adopted we think it clear that the
NASD has ample power under it to discipline a member for charging prices bearing no reasonable relation to prevailing market
prices.' 94
At about the time the Sherman Gleason proceeding developed in
the NASD, the Association was also circulating a questionnaire to its
membership surveying customary mark-ups. Responses from eightytwo per cent of the membership showed that forty-seven per cent of
the transactions were at a gross spread of not over three per cent
and seventy-one per cent were at a gross spread of not over five per
cent. These results were made known to the membership by a letter
wherein the Board of Governors cited an interpretation of rule 1 which
stated that it was deemed "conduct inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade . . . to enter into any transaction with a customer
in any security at any price not reasonably related to the current market
price of the security." The letter then went on to say:
• . . [T]he District Business Conduct Committees have been
instructed to enforce [Rule 1] as above interpreted, having in
mind the percentage of profit on which 71 per cent of the transactions above referred to were effected. In the case of certain lowpriced securities, such as those selling below $10, a somewhat
higher percentage may sometimes be justified. On the other hand,
5 per cent or even a lower rate is by no means always justified.' 5
Two weeks later a letter went out to the District Committees, the
essence of which is contained in the following two paragraphs:
[W]hen transactions show a mark-up of over 5 per cent on
the part of a member, it raises the question as to whether there is
a violation of the Rule and interpretation. In such a situation, a
193. Supra, note 57.
194. 15 S.E.C. 639, 651 (1944).
195. Matter of NASD, supra, note 75, at 473, Appendix A.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962

35

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1962], Art. 4
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 7: p. 611

duty is imposed upon the member to show to the satisfaction of
the Business Conduct Committee that no violation has occurred.
Isolated transactions, where the spread or mark-up is in excess of 5 per cent, may warrant only informal inquiry or a precautionary letter but where practice is established, formal complaint
procedure is the recommended course.' 96
Several members of the Association appealed to the SEC against
the establishment of the "5% Policy" on the grounds that it was a
"Rule," or had the practical force and effect of a "Rule," and therefore was void since not adopted by affirmative vote of the membership.
The SEC upheld the policy, declaring it was an "interpretation" of
rules 1 and 4, and thus within the power of the Board of Governors,
but also ruled that a mere showing of mark-ups in excess of five per
cent would not make out a prima facie case of violation. The Commission indicated what additional factors should be taken into consideration in passing on the propriety of mark-ups:
Determination by the committees and by the board on review
must be based on a consideration of all the pertinent factors, of
which the percentage of mark-up is only one.
Others include consideration of the dollar amounts involved,
market conditions in the particular security, the relationship between the member and his customer, and 197
any unusual circumstances incident to the particular transaction.
In the first case to come up for review after the "5 % Policy" went
into effect, the SEC further limited its stringency.' 98 In that case,
it appeared that the member firm had taken mark-ups generally in the
vicinity of seven to eight per cent, with one as high as eleven per cent,
over cost - mark-ups in the same general range as other firms in the
same neighborhood. The District Conduct Committee censured the
firm and fined it $250; the Board of Governors affirmed the penalty
on the basis of an equal division of opinion. In its decision on the
appeal, the SEC noted that the NASD rules "go beyond fraud," but
that since the firm here had fully disclosed to its customers the markups it was taking, there was no basis in fraud for finding a violation.
Therefore, the only question was of the reasonableness of the mark-ups.
[W]hile an undisclosed mark-up which is not so excessive as
to constitute fraud might nevertheless violate business ethics, it
196. Id. at 476-7, Appendix B.
197. Id. at 469-470.
198. Herrick, Waddell & Co., supra,note 111.
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does not follow that the same mark-up, accompanied by full disclosure, is always a violation of business ethics.19 0
[W]here it can be demonstrated that higher costs are due
to special services performed by the member for the customer . . .
it should be concluded that prices which exceed those charged by
competitors not rendering such special services are not in violation of the NASD's rules if the excess bears a reasonable relation
to the cost of the special services. 20
In determining whether a mark-up is proper, ...

the type of

business engaged in by the accused firm, the nature of its customers, the services performed, and the type of disclosure made are
all relevant circumstances. 20 '
The SEC then set aside the penalty imposed on the firm on the grounds
of the firm's disclosure, insufficient evidence adduced by the NASD,
and special advisory services performed for customers.
Subsequent decisions by the SEC on the problem of fair prices
have followed the same trend of examining every facet of the transaction in order to determine whether the mark-up was reasonable. One
additional criterion which has been developed is that if the firm engages
in "riskless trading," that is, it purchases securities only when it has
a firm committment to buy from a customer, then the mark-up must be
kept low. For example, in R.V. Klein Co., where the firm was taking
fifty per cent mark-ups in the sale of oil royalties, most of which were
purchased within five days of their sale, the SEC dismissed an appeal
from the NASD decision expelling the firm. The Commission held
that the prices charged were unfair in light of the relatively riskless
nature of the transactions, the large dollar volume involved and the
percentage of spread. Also, no special services or circumstances were
shown as grounds for the mark-ups. °2 Similarly, in Managed Investment Programs,°3 where the firm was buying the securities on the
same day that they were re-sold, the SEC dismissed an appeal from
the fine imposed by the NASD, on the ground that the transactions
2 4
were riskless.
199. Id. at 446.
200. Id. at 447.
201. Id. at 448.
202. Supra, note 92. The subsequent history of the Klein case is discussed
infra, p .....
203. Supra, note 117.
204. The SEC also clarified the "special services" factor in this case saying
(37 S.E.C. 783, 787 (1957)) :
Applicants have not shown any special services or other circumstances warranting the mark-ups taken. While Chadwick maintained close contact with the
affairs of the companies whose securities were being sold and visited their office,
plants, and officials, it does not appear that such activities entailed the incurring
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In Samuel B. Franklin & Co., the SEC, in dismissing the appeal,
stated the facts of the case and holding on the "risk" point thus:
In the 606 transactions involving $100 or more [in gross
dollar amount], the mark-ups were 30% or more in 55 cases, in
excess of 20% in 184 cases, over 15% in 303 cases, and over
10% in 444 cases. Furthermore, the mark-ups in many cases are
based on applicant's cost on purchases of shares of the same stock
on the same day as its sales. In many other cases the purchases
were within a few days of applicant's sales, so that shares were
held in inventory only for a short period, and applicant's transactions were without substantial risk.20 5
Here, though, as in other cases, the SEC declined to adopt a rigid
five per cent policy for itself when it held: "We find that applicant's
mark-ups ...

at least in those transactions in which they were greater

than 20% clearly were excessive." 2 ' A similar refusal to adopt such
a policy appears in the Midland Securities case20 7 where the SEC concurred in finding violations where mark-ups of from 10.4% to 67%
were taken, but, sub silentio, it set aside the finding of violations where
the mark-ups ranged from 7.1% to 8.3%.
The factor of dollar volume of the transactions, mentioned above
208
in the Franklin decision, also appears in Mitchell Securities, Inc.,
where the Commission said: "while the per share price was low, the
dollar amount of most of the transactions and of the mark-ups taken
in them was not small," and, accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
The converse of this rule appears in Boren & Co., 20 9 where mark-ups

of 10.8% and 25% were taken on $533 and $150 transactions respectively - the SEC found no violation.
A final, basic problem in the area of fair prices is what figure
shall be used as the prevailing market from which to compute the
mark-up in setting the price to the customer. It is settled now that
the price actually paid is the proper base if the security is handled
of expenses sufficient to justify the imposition of additional charges on the
customers ...
Boren & Co., supra, note 76, and Graham & Co., supra, note 179, also state the
obvious rule: "excessive expenses do not justify an excessive mark-up."
205. 38 S.E.C. 908, 911 (1959).
206. Id. at 912. It was on this ground that the SEC decision was upheld in
Franklin & Co. v. SEC, 290 F.2d 719, 725 (9th Cir. 1961). The court held:
[Tihere is no hard and fast "5 per cent rule" as complained of by petitioner. The
Commission did not discipline him merely because his commissions were in
excess of 5 per cent. It did find that his "mark-ups and mark-downs, at least
in those transactions in which they were greater than 20% clearly were
excessive . . . ." The evidence amply supports the findings of the Commission.
207. Supra, note 106. See also, W. Edward Teague, Exchange Act Release No.
6759 (1962), involving mark-ups of from 7.7% to 40%.
208. Supra, note 105.
209. Supra, note 76.
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in "riskless trading," generally, a same day purchase and re-sale. If,
however, the member has retained the security in his inventory for a
time, then the current quotations appearing in the "pink sheets" provide the base, rather than the price previously paid. 1 ' This latter rule,
of course, protects the dealer who buys low, holds while the price is
rising, and then seeks to sell. Where there is a declining market in a
security, Boren & Co.2 ' indicates that the dealer must still base his
price on current quotations and not on the price he paid for the security,
although the "reasonableness" of the mark-up may be viewed more
generously than in a rising market situation. This means that a dealer
who "invests" by placing a security in his inventory cannot simply pass
his errors in judgment, as to price movement in the market, on to
his customers.
The NASD "5% Policy" is one of the most controversial issues
regarding the Association. Indeed, some have argued that the philosophy of the allowable "spread" is but a device for imposing large-firm
domination on smaller firms in the industry by way of the Association.
This argument proceeds from the fact that most of the cases involve
low-price securities where a maximum on mark-up may mean a net
loss on the transaction when overhead, particularly salesmen's commissions, is figured into the cost of the security, whether the cost base
itself be current quotation or same day purchase price. Added to this
is the fact that a large-firm, doing a large volume of business in highprice securities, is better able to absorb losses, if any, on its business
in low-price securities, whereas a smaller firm may well have insufficient turnover in the high-price securities to offset losses in its
proportionately larger trade in low-price securities.
Putting aside the self-evident point that any good businessman
is opposed to foregoing an immediate profit unless the prospect of
long-range profit is relatively clear, (which may in large part explain
the opposition to the 5 % Policy as a whole), it still seems evident that
the Policy is not a vehicle for discrimination against smaller member
firms in view of two facts. First, from the time of initiation of the
Policy to the present, the SEC has continually refused to accept any
notion of inflexibility in a five per cent limitation on mark-ups. 21 2 In
fact, it has, in every case, set out criteria in addition to the quantum
of mark-up which induced its finding that the transaction in question
had violated the Rules of Fair Practice by virtue of the price charged.
210. The most recent statement of this rule appears in Maryland Securities
Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 6442 (1961).
211. Supra, note 76. And see note 204, supra.
212. Matter of NASD, supra, note 75 and text thereat; Samuel B. Franklin,
supra, note 205, also note 206 and text thereat.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1962

39

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1962], Art. 4

650

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

7: p. 611

In sum, the test continues to be whether the price charged "bears a
reasonable relation to the prevailing price ...on the basis of the in'
dividual facts of each case." 213
Second, the NASD itself has declared
that the 5% Policy "is a guide - not a rule,"2'14 and has established
seven other factors relevant to a determination whether the price
charged is "reasonably related to the current market price of the
security" or whether the commission charged is not unreasonable. 215
Accordingly, it seems highly doubtful that the Association is itself
attempting to enforce a rigid rule of five per cent, to say nothing of
attempting to use such a rule to discriminate against smaller firms.21
Another, and more recently developed, controversy regarding
NASD regulatory activity relates to the "free-riding" problem.21
"Free-riding" is defined as "the failure to make a bona fide public
offering, at the public offering price, of a security while participating
' 8
in its distribution as a member of an underwriting or selling group. "
The economics of free-riding are quite simple: if there is an unexpectedly great demand for a securities issue when it is first marketed,
the price on the shares immediately goes above the public offering
price at which it was agreed to be sold, that is, it becomes a "hot"
issue. Those brokers and dealers, then, who are part of the underwriting group or selling group and who are allotted certain portions
of the issue for purposes of distribution to the public, sell the allotted
shares to their own trading account, or that of a relative or business
associate, and ultimately, when the price for the new issue is well above
the offering price, re-sell the shares to the public, thereby reaping a
nice profit.
The Association, in an attempt to control this practice, has
promulgated a far-reaching Interpretation of Rule 1 of the Rules of
213. Duker v. Duker, supra, note 189; text at note 191.
214. Interpretation With Respect to Mark-Ups, NASD Manuel G-1 to -6.
215. Ibid. The seven factors are: (1) the type of security involved; (2) the
availability of the security in the market; (3) the price of the security; (4) the
amount of money involved in the transaction; (5) disclosure; (6) the pattern of
mark-ups; (7) the nature of the member's business. (This last refers to special
services performed for certain types of customers, not to the size of the office.)
216. The paucity of appeals to the SEC is one factor indicating the propriety of
this conclusion. As of Nov. 30, 1958, 1,203 complaints had been filed with district
committees, leading to 271 appeals to, or reviews, by the Board of Governors and
to twenty-six appeals to the SEC. (NASD Report 22, Appendix 4(a-2)). In addition,
the evidence in other areas of NASD practice (see, e.g., the discussion of the duty
to supervise, supra, pp. 642-43) is plainly contrary to any notion of discrimination
against smaller firms. And, finally, since election votes are allocated to firms and
not to individual representatives (see, supra, p. 616), if these were such discrimination it would surely have been corrected by now in the election of new
committeemen and board officers.
217. "Free-riding continues as perhaps the most important new disciplinary
development before us - and certainly one of the most difficult." (NASD Report to
Members 7 (1959)).
218. Interpretation with Respect to "Free-Riding and Withholding," NASD
Manual G-23 to 26.
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Fair Practice,219 which prohibits placing any of the securities (1) in
the member's own account, (2) in that of a business associate or
member of the immediate family, or (3) in an account in which any
such person has a beneficial interest, if the member "has unfilled
orders from the public . . . or has failed to make a bona fide public
offering of the securities. . . . " The member may, however, sell the
securities to an account of one of the persons named above if he can
show that they were sold "in accordance with [the buyer's] normal
investment practice with the member and that the aggregate of the
securities so withheld and sold is insubstantial and not disproportionate
in amount as compared to sales to members of the public."22 (Emphasis
added.) In the only case appealed to the SEC to date relating solely
to the NASD free-riding Interpretation, it was the "disproportionate
in amount as compared to sales to members of the public" language
that affected the member firm. 22 ' There, the firm sold 26.6% of its
allottment as a member of the selling group to its employees' profitsharing retirement plan. Relying solely on this fact,222 the NASD
imposed a $500 fine. The SEC dismissed the appeal, concurring with
the Association's position that the "normal investment practice" of the
member firm is irrelevant when the firm withholds for its own use
a disproportionate share of the issue.
Any doubt as to the propriety of, or necessity for, this type of
regulation by the NASD is settled upon noting the Association's
declared rationale:
The failure to make a bona fide public offering when there is a
great demand for an issue can be a factor in artificially raising
the price. Not only is such failure in contravention of ethical
practices, but it [sic] impairs public confidence in the fairness of
the securities business.2 23
In sustaining the NASD decision in the First California case,
SEC declared the effect of such withholding to be:

24

the

219. Ibid.
220. Ibid. The definition of "normal investment practice" for the purpose of
this Interpretationexpressly excludes "a practice of purchasing mainly 'hot issues'."
221. First California Co., CCH Fed. See. L. Rep.
76,773 (1961).
In one other case, Leonard Zigman, Exchange Act Release No. 6701 (1962),
the SEC sustained the suspension of a representative for twelve months where he
had withheld for his own benefit some portion of the employer firm's share in a
distribution. The chief ground of violation in the case, however, was that the
representative had maintained a trading account with the employer firm under a
fictitious name whereby he could conceal his identity when engaging in trading.
222. The actual profit to the employees' retirement plan on re-sale of the
securities was a little under $225, although at one time there was a paper profit of
$1,600.
223. Interpretation with Respect to "Free-Riding and Withholding," supra note
218.
224. Supra, note 221 and text thereat.
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...not only to give to the insiders the opportunity for a profit
on the shares withheld . . . but also to restrict the supply and
tend to raise the market price further and enable the insiders to
realize an increased profit upon subsequent sale of the shares
retained by them.225
One final general category 226 of inequitable trade practices dealt
with by the NASD is breach of a quasi-fiduciary duty owed the customer by failure to protect his interest in conducting transactions in his
account. One rubric for this sort of violation, "excessive trading," is
exemplified in R.H. Johnson & Co. 227 There, a registered representative effected 648 transactions in the accounts of a widow and her
daughter amounting to a gross dollar volume of over a million dollars
and a paper loss to the account of better than $26,000. In addition,
the securities acquired in 208 of the 348 purchase transactions were
re-sold within six months; one-third of the purchases were made
between a dividend declaration date and the ex-dividend date so that
the customers were led to believe that they were achieving a net gain
in the trading by receiving this "income." The Board of Governors
affirmed the District Committee's revocation of the representative's
registration on the ground that he had violated Rules 1 and 2 of the
Rules of Fair Practice by inducing trading in the account which, in
view of the financial resources and character of the account, was excessive in volume and frequency.
A less spectacular example of the same practice, in terms of dollar
amount involved, is First Securities Corp.,228 where the gross volume
of "churning" in an elderly widow's account was close to $293,000,
225. The NASD has just embarked on an investigation into another aspect of
securities distributions by establishing, on December 26, 1961, a Committee on
Underwriting Agreements to review "arrangements between issuers and underwriters in connection with the offering of securities of unseasoned companies" to
determine whether "the compensation received by underwriters for marketing these
securities was unfair and unreasonable."

Relevant factors in measuring the reason-

ableness of the underwriters' compensation include: (1) the nature of the underwriting agreement (best efforts, all or none, or firm commitment) ; (2) receipt by the
underwriter of stock warrants or options; (3) allowance of expenses to the underwriter.

226. A miscellany of cases involving violations of the Rules of Fair Practice in
addition to those falling within the categories discussed include: Graham & Co.,
supra, note 179, where the firm violated Rule 13 in failing to disclose that the firm
and the issuer of the security were under common control; Sherman Gleason & Co.,
supra, note 57, where the firm commingled securities owned by it and others owned

by customers in a single hypothecation; Boren & Co., supra, note 76, where a certain
sales literature, not filed with the NASD as required by the Rules, extolled the
virtues of a certain investment but failed to reveal the risks; Gordon M. Copp,
supra, note 121, where a representative caused a member firm to execute purchases
for certain accounts without the authorization of the owners of those accounts;
Bennett-Manning Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6632 (1961), where the firm
failed to comply with the net capital rule.
227. Supra, note 184.
228. Exchange Act Release No. 6497 (1961).
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resulting in a paper loss of about $2,000. In sustaining a sixty-day
suspension of the employer firm for failure to supervise adequately
the representative who did the actual trading, the SEC particularly
noted that the customer "was substantially dependent on the income
from her investments, was uninformed concerning securities matters,
and relied completely on the advice given her by [the representative]."
Finally, in Thomas Arthur Stewart,2 29 the firm, with the cooperation
of the two customers whose accounts were involved, developed a
"get-rich-quick" scheme whereby, dealing only in the shares of openend investment companies, the shares would be redeemed almost immediately after they went ex-dividend and the proceeds then re-invested
in the shares of a company about to declare a dividend. (Stewart got
as his commission about six per cent of the purchase price of the
shares.) The result of the scheme was that one customer showed a
gross loss for the year's transactions of $2,526 and the other lost
$1,400. In dismissing the appeal from a one-year suspension, the SEC
accorded Stewart "the doubtful distinction of having originated the
scheme" and held:
Both of these accounts disclose an amount of trading greater than
that warranted by the nature of the securities dealt in or by the
size of the accounts and the pattern of the transactions . . .
indicates an illusory belief on the part of the customers that they
were . .. [receiving] multiple dividends.230
The Stewart case also declares the other rubric under which this
category of fiduciary duty cases is decided - "unsuitable recommendations to purchase" - which springs directly from the express terms of
Rule 2 of the Rules of Fair Practice. The NASD bodies had based
their finding of violation in Stewart on the fact that he had:
• . . recommended the purchase and sale of the shares without
having reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendations were suitable for such customers on the basis of "facts disclosed by such customers as to their
' 231 security holdings and as to
their financial situation and needs."
229. 20 S.E.C. 196 (1945).
230. Id. at 202.
231. Id. at 201. The inter-quoted portion is from Rule 2 of the Rules of Fair
Practice, NASD Manual D-5.
In Boren & Co., supra, note 76, the firm had recommended and effected the
purchase of open-end investment company shares for its customer in the apparent
belief that such shares were "good for every one." The SEC concurred with the
view of the NASD that this bona fide, but wrong, belief did not preclude finding a
failure to give adequate consideration to the propriety of these shares as an investment
for this customer. Accordingly, a finding of violation of the Rules of Fair Practice
was sustained.
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In Standard Bond and Share Co. and William G. Stein,3 2 the
firm, in 1949, caused the purchase of two bonds, at about half their
face value, on the basis of a 1942 Standard & Poor report. In fact,

the three most recent annual reports of the issuer showed that it had
lost its principal asset and expressly warned that the regular payment
of interest on the bonds, which had occurred in the past, should not
deceive anyone as to the issuer's prospects. The report also stated that
liquidation would provide insufficient funds to pay the bond principal.

The SEC held, in its dismissal of the appeal from a thirty-day suspension and fine:
The customer to whom applicants recommended purchase of the
bonds was entitled to a disclosure of the material facts necessary
to determine whether the bonds were a suitable investment for
her. . . . It is clear that the applicants should have ascertained
and disclosed to the customer the facts ...indicating the limited
income and payment prospects of the bonds. ... 23

Similarly, in Philips & Co. and Gerald G. Bernheimer,2 84 where
the member firm recommended speculative securities to customers of
small means with "extravagant representations and glowing promises
as to future profits," the SEC dismissed the appeal from a one-year
suspension and laid down the following rule:
The test is whether Bernheimer [the representative] fulfilled the
obligation he assumed when he undertook to counsel the customers, of making only such recommendations as would be consistent with the customer's financial situation and needs. The
record shows that Bernheimer knew all the facts necessary to
enable him to realize235that reasonable grounds for his recommendations did not exist.

Little, if any, comment is called for in this area of NASD practice. The cases where an obligation in the nature of a fiduciary's duty
to disclose and to treat fairly has been imposed on Association members and representatives, clearly touch the essence of the function of
the Association as intended by Congress. All the acts held violative
of the Rules of Fair Practice here, not only the "free-riding" practice,
are "in contravention of ethical practices" and impair "public confidence in the fairness of the securities business.

'28 6

232. 34 S.E.C. 208 (1952).
233. Id. at 211.
234. Supra, note 89.
235. 37 S.E.C. 66, 70 (1956).
236. See text at note 233, supra.
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CONCLUSION

For the intrepid reader who has ventured this far in a study of
the National Association of Securities Dealers the conclusion must be
obvious: the Association is performing the job entrusted it by Congress
in 1938 far better than might reasonably have been predicted at that
time. Unquestionably, the Association has on occasion over-reached
23 7
itself, as in the attempt to cause specific performance of contracts
and in the first declarations about the 5% Policy.2"8 But then, what
regulatory body, be it administrative agency or court, has not occasionally been called upon to assess the proper reach of its power?
And, on the other hand, the evidence of a praiseworthy performance
by the Association is heavy indeed. There seems to be no substantiation for any charge of Association discrimination against smaller firms,
contrary to the popularly held notion of the necessary operation of a
trade association." 9 The number of appeals taken to the Board of
Governors from District Committee decisions is small, about one in
three, 240 and the number of appeals to the SEC from the Board of
Governors is even smaller, about one in ten,2 4' clearly indicating
satisfaction on the part of the membership, even those subjected to dis2 42
ciplinary proceedings, with the operation of the Association.
Similarly, one is hard pressed to think of an instance where the
public interest has been disserved by Association activity. But instances
of regulation benefiting the public interest are numerous. One need
only note the three discussed immediately above: control of mark-ups
on the sale of securities; ensuring that public offerings of securities
are public; and, preventing abuses of the trust imposed in a broker or
dealer by an untutored investor. No less important are NASD achievements barely touched on in the above discussion, such as: examination
of individuals engaged in the securities business; enforcement of the
Federal Reserve Board margin requirements; and publication of daily
quotations of bid and asked prices for industry and investor guidance.
In a word, cooperative regulation of the over-the-counter securities
industry, in the public interest, has been successfully achieved.
237. Supra, pp. 631-32; 636-39.
238. Supra, pp. 645-46.
239. Supra. pp. 649-50.
240. NASD Report 22, Exhibit 4(a-2). See note 216, supra. To reach this
figure the total number of dismissals (349) is subtracted from the total number of
complaints filed (1203) and the resulting figure set off against appeals to the
Board (271).
241. Ibid.
242. In 1942 the Commercial and Financial Chronicle conducted a survey of
broker and dealers in the over-the-counter market, both those who were and those
who were not NASD members, as to their opinions about the Association and certain
of its practices with results none too favorable to the Association. (See Cherrington,
Ioc. cit. stipra, note 38, at 756). It should be noted, however, that the sampling
reported from that survey is not of the sort normally required for statistical
reliability_
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